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Abstract
The visually rich facial expressions of emotion continue to be an intriguing phenomenon 
in the study of human emotion neuropsychology. Emotions have many important functions, 
some of the most significant being their role in the dynamics of communication and behaviour 
and the way in which they influence the decision making process and guide behaviour. Given 
the significance of emotion within the social context, it is important to understand how its 
diverse functions are mediated and coordinated effectively in facial expressions of emotion. 
Moreover, it is important to understand how the adequacy of perception of facial expressions of 
emotion might contribute to aberrant behaviour, such as demonstrated by antisocial youth.
The aim of this study was to explore if the social difficulties experienced by incarcerated 
youth are related, in part, to some deficit in perceiving socially important information conveyed 
by facial expressions o f emotion. Furthermore, it sought to investigate the underlying structural 
or functional impairment of processing facial emotion within this subpopulation. Inasmuch as 
alexithymia has been associated with functional problems in accurately detecting facial 
emotion, this study sought to determine if alexithymia was a contributing factor in perceptual 
performance. In phase 1, thirty-two incarcerated youth between the ages o f IS and 18 years 
were asked to detect six target facial expressions of emotion under temporal constraints. In 
phase 2, the detection performance of the incarcerated youth was tested against the detection 
performance o f 31 non-incarcerated youth, aged 17 to 18 years.
In phase I, detection performance by the incarcerated participants did not differ 
significantly regardless of the degree o f alexithymia (low, intermediate or high) or possible 
affect problems resulting firom their incarceration. In phase 2, the incarcerated participants
ii
performed significantly poorer in accurately detecting happy, surprise, disgust and anger facial 
expressions; however, alexithymia was not significantly associated with the perception 
performance of either sample.
It was discussed that the underlying basis for the poorer performance by the incarcerated 
participants was likely due to a functionally deficient attentional system when subjected to time 
demands. It was also discussed that alexithymia may contribute to behavioural issues 
demonstrated by incarcerated youth.
m
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract.................................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents..................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables.............................................................................................................................vii
List of Figures........................................................................................................................... viii
Acknowledgement................................................................................................................... ix
Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter One Literature Review of Facial Emotion. .3
Defining Emotion............................................................................ 3
The Expressive Face........................................................................ 5
Perception of Facial Emotion......................................................... 6
Attention Processes.................................................................. 6
Perception of Facial Expressions of Emotion..........................8
Perception o f Facial Identity and Emotion: Separate Processes 11
Development of Facial Emotion...................................................... 12
Emotional Regulation and Dysregulation........................................ 14
Hemispheric Asymmetry of Facial Emotion...................................18
Neurological Substrates of Facial Emotion.....................................19
Neurophysiological Associations with Facial Emotion.................. 24
Alexithymia and the Perception of Facial Emotion
and Emotional Regulation............................................................25
Literature Review of Neuropsychological Deficits
Associated with Incarcerated Youth............................................................29
iv
Associated Neuropsychological Deficits..........................................30
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.........................................31
Learning and Language Deficits.......................................................34
The Biology of Difficult Temperament: Emotion Dysregulation.... 36
Central Nervous System Anomalies.................................................39
Detecting Facial Emotion................................................................. 39
Purpose of Study and Hypotheses................................................................40
Chapter 2 Methods.........................................................................................................42
Phase 1: Incarcerated Sample....................................................................... 42
Participants....................................................................................... 42
Measures........................................................................................... 42
Materials........................................................................................... 44
Design and Procedure....................................................................... 45
Debriefing......................................................................................... 46
Phase 2: Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Sample....................................47
Subjects............................................................................................. 47
Measures, Materials, Design and Procedure.....................................47
Chapter 3 Results...........................................................................................................48
Phase I: Analysis for Incarcerated Sample...................................................48
TAS-20 and PANAS Descriptive Statistics......................................48
Detection Index (A’) Analysis..........................................................49
Phase 2: Analysis for Between Samples....................................................... 55
TAS-20 Descriptive States............................................................... 55
V
Detection Index (A’) Analysis..........................................................56
Chapter 4 Discussion.....................................................................................................64
Phase 1...........................................................................................................64
Phase 2...........................................................................................................66
Biological Explanations................................................................................ 69
Theoretical Implications of a Deficit in Detection Performance................. 74
Alexithymia and Young Offenders............................................................... 77
General Theoretical Implications From The Study......................................80
Limitations Of The Study............................................................................ 81
Conclusions...................................................................................................83
Future Research.............................................................................................84
References.................................................................................................................................. 86
Appendix A - Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) Questionnaire.................... 98
Appendix B - Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20) Questionnaire............................100
Appendix C - Consent Form............................................................. 104
Appendix D - Table 3.6 Two Tailed T-Test for Paired Emotion Comparisons......................106
VI
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithymia Groups for Incarcerated Youth
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for PANAS Groups for Incarcerated Youth
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Emotion Detection Sensitivity A1 by PANAS Group for
Incarcerated Sample
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for FEE Detection Sensitivity A/ for TAS Group for
Incarcerated Sample
Table 3.5 Two Tailed T-Tests for Paired Emotion Comparisons for Within-Subject Effects
Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithymia Groups by Sample
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for FEE Detection Sensitivity A1 for TAS Group by
Sample
Table 3.8 Descriptive Statistics for the Between Sample Effects of Emotion (A3
Table 3.9 Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithymia Factors by Sample
Vll
List of Figures
Figure 3.1 Mean Detection Sensitivity A1 for Samples
Figure 3.2 Within-Subject Emotion by Sample Interaction Effect for Fear, Anger, Disgust
and Sad Between Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Samples
vni
Acknowledgements
I should like to thank ray thesis coraraittee. Dr. Glenda Prkachin, Dr. Ken Prkachin and 
Dr. Glen Schmidt for their assistance in this process. I ara grateful to ray thesis supervisor. Dr. 
Glenda Prkachin, for her contributions and insightful criticisms.
I also wish to acknowledge the residents o f the youth custody centre who participated 
in this study.
Finally, I thank ray family for their support.
IX
Introduction
Emotion and its associated phenomena continue to be an intriguing and fascinating 
aspect of scientific study in human neuropsychology. Emotions and their expressions in speech, 
literature, art, and theater have been part of human experience throughout recorded history 
(Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996). Whenever people interact, they experience, express, and 
perceive emotion in what is a complex and often seemingly unconscious process (Strongman, 
1996), providing information that requires various levels of analysis to disentangle pertinent 
stimuli. The attention to emotion that is evident throughout history bespeaks something 
significant with regard to the human organism. Of the potential expressive modalities of 
emotion, the visually rich facial expressions of emotion (FEE) have been the subject of much 
empirical research and are probably the best understood (Gottman, 1993; Oatley & Jenkins,
1992).
Several functions of emotion are noted in the literature. For example, emotion plays a 
significant role in communication in the social constructs of society and acts as a signal of one’s 
internal state and functioning, configuring mental resources and making ready for certain kinds 
of action (Damasio, 1994; Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 1997; Singh et al., 1998; Thompson, 1988). 
Emotions communicate to others, resulting in changes to the dynamics of interaction, from 
cooperation to withdrawal, and conflict to deference (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Emotion is 
instrumental in the decision making process and helps one formulate useful solutions (Damasio, 
1994; Rolls, 1990; Siminov, 1997; Stein & Levine, 1989). This is particularly true in instances 
where there are competing concurrent goals, emergencies and temporal demands, and the 
resources o f rational thought are too limited, too slow, or too error-prone to solve problems, 
prioritize and coordinate behavior in a manner that is superior to random choice (Johnson-Laird 
& Oately, 1992). Moreover, emotion is instrumental in guiding behavior for self-preservation
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(MacLean, 1993; Rolls, 1990), dealing with fundamental life-tasks, and promoting immediate 
attention to important interpersonal encounters (Ekman, 1992b).
Emotion also functions in the communication of emotional states, playing a survival 
role, and in assisting in the ongoing evolution of what is significant for the individual or group, 
and the stability of social organization (Rolls, 1990; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1987). Emotion 
impacts the social attachment between parents and their young that serves to increase the 
likelihood of the next generation’s survival (Rolls, 1990). Furthermore, emotion can affect the 
cognitive evaluation o f events and memories and their interpretations, storage, and recall (Rolls,
1990).
Given the significance of emotion to human beings, and its stature within the social 
context, it is important to understand how its complex and diverse functions are mediated and 
coordinated effectively in facial expressions of emotion. Moreover, it is important to 
understand how the adequacy of accurate perception of facial expressions of emotion might 
contribute to aberrant behaviour, such as demonstrated by antisocial youth.
To the author’s knowledge, there has been no published research about the potential 
relationship between the neuropsychology underlying the perception of FEE and the associated 
neuropsychology underlying the troubled behavior of incarcerated youth. The aim of this study 
was to explore potential neuropsychological links between these two areas.
CHAPTER ONE 
Literature Review of Facial Emotion
Defining Emotion
Characterizing and defining human emotion has encompassed the evocation, modulation 
and combination of phenomena such as cognition, feelings, visceral, neurological, and 
biochemical reactions; expressive displays (e.g., vocal, facial, posture and other overt behavior); 
and relating internal and external stimuli (Cacioppo, Klein, Bemtson, & Hatfield, 1993). The 
aggregate information in the literature provides plausible conceptual explanations and 
definitions of emotion.
Facial expressions, some of the better studied expressive phenomena of emotion, have 
been most often characterized and supported by research as physiologically discrete categories 
(e.g., the happy feature configuration is discretely different fi’om sad) (Calder et al., 1996; 
Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 1992a; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Young et al., 1997). Some emotions 
(i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, and anger) have frequently been described and 
supported in the research as innate, evolutionarily prewired, basic, and universal (Damasio,
1994; Ekman, 1992a; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; McNaughton, 1989; Thompson, 1988). 
Other emotions are considered more complex, such as secondary emotions (e.g., variations and 
nuances of primary or basic themes) that result from greater cognitive elaborations, more 
adaptively flexible and individualized, and experientially learned (Damasio, 1994). Feelings are 
another factor in defining emotion. Feelings are sometimes referred to as emotion (LeDoux, 
1994; Thompson, 1988) or physiological activity relating to emotion, rather than emotion per se 
(Damasio 1994; Thompson, 1988). Given the current information about emotion, it is 
reasonable to consider that FEE are probably more accurately conceptualized as categorical, at
least a few of which are primary (predispositional) and universal in nature (i.e., sad, angry, 
happy, surprise, disgust, and fear) and have associated feelings.
Theories of emotion differ regarding whether emotional evaluation of events is 
considered to be automatic, preceding conscious evaluation, or if  conscious evaluation is a 
necessary antecedent of emotion (Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 1992a; Halgren, 1992; LeDoux, 
1993a; Johnson-Laird & Oately, 1992; Thompson, 1988). Current neuroscientific research has 
found no compelling evidence that emotion and cognition are necessarily opposed; rather, they 
are likely juxtaposed or take place synchronously. Emotion and reason are at some point 
interwoven and emotional evaluation occurs within the cognitive system (Damasio, 1998; 
Halgren, 1992; Lane, Kivley, Du Bois, Shamasundara, & Schwartz, 1995; Rolls, 1990; 
Strongman, 1996). This close consequential interaction of emotion and cognition makes it 
difficult to dissociate the two, as the degradation o f one seems to affect the other (Halgren,
1992).
Emotion has been further characterized as:
.. .a collection of changes in the body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve 
cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the 
content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event. Many changes in the body 
state-those in skin color, body posture, facial expression, for instance-are actually 
perceptible to an external observer...Other changes in body state are perceptible only 
to the owner of the body in which it took place. (Damasio, 1994, p. 139).
Although clearly defining emotion continues to be the subject of considerable
discussion, a substantial broad agreement seems to exist on some of its characteristics (Izard,
1993). For instance, emotion involves particular or specialized neural processes rather than 
undifferentiated generalized processes. Also, emotion is defined as an expressive or efferent 
activity in the central nervous system (e.g., facial expressions), and as registering in some level 
of consciousness (e.g., feelings, motivations, perceptions and attributions such as: sad, happy.
angry, etc.). Furthermore, there are likely a small set of FEE (i.e., sadness, happiness, anger, 
disgust, fear, and surprise) that are highly recognizable and appear to reflect a universal 
emotional phenomenon (Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996).
The Expressive Face
Faces form the source of a multitude o f inferences. From the face we are able to 
determine identity, gender, age, and what one is trying to convey. Regarding emotion, FEE in 
humans has been the subject of extensive empirical research (Gottman, 1993; Oatley & Jenkins, 
1992). Emotional facial expressions are effective communicators despite significant language 
and cultural differences; they provide coarse evaluations of one’s underlying emotional state 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992), are highly salient and easily detected (Prkachin & Prkachin, 
under review), and are able to communicate social information rapidly and with definition 
(Etcoff, 1984). This is not surprising, as the human organism is highly dependent on social 
interaction for survival and relies on its ability to recognize and distinguish the information that 
is relayed.
Facial expressions of emotion are produced by the combinations of varied and specific 
movements of facial skin, movements of the facial musculature and so on (Damasio, 1994; 
Tassinary & Cacioppo, 1992). These movements produce wrinkles, folds, and lines, and 
change the position of the brows and the comers of the mouth. The resulting expressions are 
thought to have distinct patterns and to be qualitatively different firom one another, configuring 
a specific emotion category, at least for the basic emotions (Ekman, 1992b; Etcoff & Magee, 
1992).
Muscle displacement involved in facial expressions has also been identified as important 
support for the configuration o f categorical FEE. For example, expressions tend to be 
considered smiles when the distance between the comers of the mouth and the eyes is less than
40% of the maximum distance, a distinct and qualitative difference from other emotions (Hess 
et al., 1997).
Perception of Facial Emotion
Attentional Processes
Considering that perception of facial emotion starts with understanding the basic notion 
of attentional processes, it has been suggested that attention involves a moment to moment shift 
in awareness between the information provided by the external environment and one’s 
experience; for example, the awareness of sensations, perceptions and conceptions o f emotion 
about the self and others (Prkachin, in preparation). As the attentional system has a limited 
capacity, efficient and effective functioning presumes the need for it to be selective about what 
is brought into awareness (Flavell & Miller, 1998). It is well accepted in the literature that 
attention is a selective rather than a random process. From birth, babies selectively attend to 
their environment, displaying a preference to explore some aspects over others (Butterworth, 
1998). One such early selection relates to faces. This early attention bias supports the notion 
that development of specific brain circuitry acts in concert with the species’ typical environment 
to bias the input o f later developing circuitry. Neurophysiological recording reveals that 
individual cells code diverse specific characteristics (or ‘trigger features’) of the environment 
(Bomstein, 1992). These features, for example, wavelength, orientation of form, movement and 
so on, stimulate specific neurons in the visual system. It is this process of selective attention 
that enables the person to isolate informative aspects of stimulus variation from the 
environment, thus providing the differentiation o f perception (Butterworth, 1998).
As it relates to the external environment, attention is normally focused where one looks, 
or towards the direction in which one’s eyes are fixated. Thus, attentional processes and visual 
orienting most often work together to bring objects in the central foveal visual region in line for
further scrutiny (Motter, 1998). This visual scrutiny is a dynamic interaction between the visual 
signals entering the brain and a variety of internal biases functioning to ensure the processing of 
behaviorally relevant rather than irrelevant stimuli. Some of these biases are hard-wired into 
the visual system (i.e., the possibility o f attentional templates) to facilitate the processing of 
certain stimulus configurations (Corbetta, 1998). Given the hypothesized universality and 
primacy of basic FEE, it is reasonable to consider that basic FEE fits within the notion of 
attentional templates, at least to some degree, and with regard to some emotions more than 
others. To accomplish all of the above requires an attentional system with at least three 
operating functions: alerting or vigilance, orienting, and target detection.
Such a system has been proposed in the literature (Jackson, Marrocco, & Posner, 1994; 
Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998; Swanson et al., 1988). There are two attentional subsystems, the 
anterior attentional system (AAS) and posterior attentional system (PAS), comprised of three 
networks. The alerting network functions to maintain an organism’s readiness to react to 
stimuli by suppressing background neural noise through the inhibition of irrelevant mental 
activity. This network involves brain regions centered in the right frontal lobe and right parietal 
lobe. The orienting network functions to motorize special neuronal operations needed to bring 
attention to the relevant visual location (selective visual search) and bind signals into object 
perception. The brain regions involved are purported to be centered in the posterior parietal 
lobe and thalamus. The executive network coordinates multiple specialized neural processes, 
for example, target detection (color, form, category), to direct behavior. The brain regions 
involved are purported to be those centered in the anterior cingulate, left lateral frontal lobe, and 
basal ganglia. These functions o f the attentional system become associated with tasks for the 
purpose of boosting signals in various brain regions to increase the probability o f relevant signal 
detection. Thus, attention selects the content in one’s current awareness.
In this attentional model, the basal ganglia and anterior cingulate are significant in target 
detection. The basal ganglia contribute through their manifold connections to the cortex via a 
cortico-striate-thalamo-cortical circuit dedicated to common information processing (Jackson et 
al., 1994). In this way the basal ganglia act as a comparator of coded spatial representations by 
the AAS and PAS; and, modulate the circuitry of the AAS by enhancing relevant signal strength 
and suppressing irrelevant signals. The anterior cingulate contributes target detection by 
boosting activation and reactivation of signals for feature selection in extrastriate regions 
(Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998).
Research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) provides support for this 
model of an attentional system (Swanson et al., 1998). Studies using event related potentials 
(ERPs) suggest abnormalities in the right fi-ontal region, implicating the alerting network, and 
the right parietal region, implicating the orienting network. Research using imaging technology, 
such as positron emission tomography (PET), suggests abnormalities in the frontal lobe, 
implicating both the alerting and executive networks. Studies using magnetic resonance 
imaging (aMRl) show a smaller than normal size corpus collosum, basal ganglia, and right 
frontal lobes, thus implicating all three networks (orienting, alerting, and executive 
respectively). ADHD symptomatology involved with inattention suggests poor sustained 
attention related to an alerting deficit, poor selective attention related to an orienting deficit, and 
poor stimulus detection related to an executive function deficit. As can be gathered from the 
above discussion, accurate perception requires an adequately functioning attentional system to 
gather relevant task information.
Perception of Facial Expressions of Emotion
Given that the face provides a great deal of nonverbal information, it is reasonable to 
consider from an adaptive and evolutionary perspective that at least some FEE would be more
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immediately perceptible. It has been argued that overt expressions would be of little value if 
humans failed to decode and respond to the display (Dimberg, 1997). In keeping with this, it 
has been proposed that FEE perception (e.g., detection) is to some degree preattentively and 
automatically accessible to the perceiver (White, 1995). In other words, humans may be 
hardwired for the detection of FEE. Various expressions of emotion are thought to reflect, for 
example, differing spatial relationships among facial features (Damasio, 1994; McKelvie, 1995; 
Tassinary & Cacioppo, 1992). This perceptual process can be conceptualized as begitming with 
the parallel scanning of the visual field for biologically relevant features (i.e., configural-feature 
processing of colour, contours, size, and spatial relationships) which are then conjoined to form 
the percept of the face (Coren & Ward, 1989). The determination of FEE perception accuracy 
would likely depend on one’s ability to inhibit the automatic, preattentive processing of 
unwanted (nontarget) encoded information.
Further to understanding the process of FEE perception, it has been suggested 
(Desimone, 1991) that such perception of facial expression is a specialized neural mechanism 
that evolved to facilitate social communication independent of the larger pattern perception 
process, wherein facial emotion is detected in terms of discrete categories (Etcoff & Magee, 
1992). In line with this notion, one theoretical assumption is that continuous perceptual 
information is transferred fiom the nearest prototypical category to the underlying emotion 
processing system until discrimination is made (Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Young et al., 1997). 
Research (Prkachin & Prkachin, 1994, under review) using adaptation tests (procedures that 
diminish the ability to detect FEE) has shown that adaptation selectively disrupts the perception 
o f happiness, sadness, anger, disgust and surprise. Once a person has been repeatedly exposed 
to a particular FEE in a short period of time, perception of that FEE is significantly reduced; 
however, the perception of other FEE is not affected, thus providing evidence that FEE can be
dissociated as categorical. This categorization process is likely subserved by specialized 
mechanisms.
Another possibility is that the perceptual processing of FEE could be either categorical 
(emphasizing configurai, or perceptual-whole, processing) or featural (emphasizing specific 
compontential processing; e.g., nose, lips). A possible determinant of the processing mode may 
be spatial fi-equency. Low spatial firequencies are thought to be mediated by neurons with faster 
conduction velocities, whereas the information contained in high spatial frequencies is mediated 
by neurons with slower conduction velocities (Kirita & Endo, 1995). Therefore, facial 
expressions of emotion which contain many low frequency spatial qualities (less complex 
encoded information) are more likely to be processed configurally (faster temporal processing), 
and facial expressions of emotion which contain many high frequency spatial qualities (more 
complex encoded information) are more likely to be processed componentially (slower temporal 
processing).
The literature provides some support for this notion, suggesting variability in the various 
aspects of perception (e.g., detection, recognition, and labeling of FEE) (Hess et al, 1997; 
Prkachin, in preparation). That is to say, we do not attend or respond to all FEE in exactly the 
same way and the processes engaged by each emotion expression may be different. For 
example, happy faces are recognized more quickly and accurately than any other facial 
expression (McKelvie, 1995), followed by sadness suggesting, configurai processing, while 
fear, surprise, anger and disgust are more difficult to detect (Prkachin & Pricachin, 1994) 
suggesting componential processing. Although research continues to explore the variable 
processing question, what can be gleaned fit>m the above information is that FEE are 
qualitatively different fix>m one another and thus perceived at different speeds and accuracy.
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Perception of Facial Identity and Emotion: Separate Processes
There are at least two types of configurai information thought to be perceived in the face 
that determine face identity (FI) recognition. These are the appropriate or expected location of 
facial features and spatial or relational configuration of features (Baenninger, 1994). Perceptual 
identification involves the extrapolation of particularities such as the specific locational and 
relational feature configuration. For example, the nose is always in the same place on the face. 
There are also variable relationships that make a face unique from a more relative configuration 
common to all faces (Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992). Maintaining the integrity of FI, 
there are many potential categorical dynamic spatial configurations (i.e., FEE) that are 
perceived as information about the emotional state of the person (McKelvie, 1995). Although a 
single facial component (upturned comers of the mouth) may provide some clue to a particular 
FEE (happiness), the perception of facial affect is dependent upon interaction of the moving 
internal features of the face (e.g., brow, eyes, and mouth). Therefore, one could consider that 
this configurai information is ultimately more important than any particular feature for both FI 
and FEE perception. Furthermore, one could assume that FI and FEE perception result from the 
same process.
It has been proposed that the recognition of FI and FEE share at least an early processing 
stage based on configurai information (McKelvie, 1995) and are thus subserved by the same 
anatomical system. However, the literature also poses a convincing argument about a double 
dissociation between the processing of FI and facial affect, suggesting that the two are 
subserved by two anatomically separable neural systems (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1996). Research involving monkeys provides evidence that suggests that facial 
expression and identity are coded by separate populations o f cells in the brain (Desimone,
1991). While identity appears to be coded by neurons in the inferior temporal gyrus, facial
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expression is thought to be coded by neurons in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Desimone,
1991). Further evidence for this dissociation comes from recent PET research that found that 
neurons in superior temporal sulcus (STS), in either hemisphere, do not apparently significantly 
participate in the processing of FI in humans (Sergent et al., 1992). Other recent evidence using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRl) showed that FI in humans elicited a stronger 
response in the fusiform gyrus then in the STS (Hoffinan & Haxby, 2000), and that dynamic 
aspects of the face such as eye and mouth movement significantly activated a region of the STS 
(Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998).
Recent research demonstrated that adaptation was selective to the particular FEE 
exposed, independent o f the individual face on which the expression occurred (Prkachin & 
Prkachin, 1994). This result supports the physiological findings outlined above, suggesting that 
neurons that respond to FEE are likely from different populations of neurons for identity, and 
that different FEE are selectively coded by different neurons in the STS. Thus one can 
confidently conceive that the processing of FEE and FI are likely parallel processes and appear 
to be somewhat distinguishable.
Development of Facial Emotion
Although the specific temporal emergence of emotional displays and the specific 
number of emotional displays present in young children are not exactly consistent across 
studies, there is evidence that specific differentiated basic FEE, corresponding to adult 
conceptions of what some specific FEE should look like, are present in infancy (Camras, 
Holland, & Patterson, 1993; Fischer, Shaver, & Camochan, 1990; Lewis, 1993; Oatley & 
Jenkins, 1996). At least three emotions are noticeable in the neonate (disgust, happiness, 
interest) with others noticeable within the first year of life (Shaffer, 1996; Thompson, 1988) as 
the facial muscle groups become more refined and coordinated (Brown, 1993). By the end of
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the first 3 years of life, a child has come to possess an elaborate and complex emotional system, 
with the majority of adult emotions having emerged and developed. Further emotions may 
emerge and existing ones elaborate (Lewis, 1993), thus demonstrating both the innateness and 
malleability of emotional development (McNaughton, 1989).
Although there is some variability across studies, basic emotions emerge in all normal 
infants at roughly the same age and across cultures (Shaffer, 1996). This suggests strongly that 
at least some emotions are basic and fundamentally biologically programmed rather than the 
result of differentiation through experience alone (McNaughton, 1989). While exposure and 
experience play an important role, this universal emergence of basic emotions supports the 
notion that humans are biologically wired to send certain emotional signals.
The ability to perceive FEE is also present in young children. Given that humans are 
biologically wired to send certain facial emotional signals, it would be reasonable to consider 
that a selective attention exists to detect and interpret these signals. It has been suggested that 
innately available face detectors direct and control infant attention to faces (Slater & 
Butterworth, 1997). Furthermore, infants appear to be attracted to faces because these visual 
targets possess factors that are seen best by them (e.g., they are rich in contrast, moderate in 
complexity, and have curvatures) (Shaffer, 1996). It has also been observed that by 4 months of 
age infants demonstrate an ability to distinguish and respond to eye gaze, and that by no later 
than 2 or 3 months of age infants display preferential head turning and eye tracking to follow 
schematic versus scrambled face patterns (Johnson, 1998).
Research supports the conclusion that children also perceive specific FEE (Oatley & 
Jenkins, 1992). For example, by 3 months of age infants seem to discriminate photos of happy, 
sad and angry faces and also act appropriately to natural displays of emotion, acting gleeful to 
happy faces and distressed in response to angry or sad faces (Shaffer, 1996). Infants are likely
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to turn away and play less if the mother looks sad and freeze if she looks angry, thus implying 
perception and meaningful responses (Harris, 1995b). By 6 months of age, infants discriminate 
posed versions of sad, happy and angry expressions (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987). Moreover, 
the discrimination led these infants to demonstrate emotional expressions that mirrored the 
emotions detected (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987). Also by 6 months of age, infants can abstract 
the invariant features of a happy expression regardless of identity (Flavell & Miller, 1998). 
Taken together, research suggests that in the first year of life children are able to at least 
discriminate happy from sad and angry faces (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996).
Under the age of 2 years, children definitely react to the emotions of others and start to 
exhibit signs of empathy (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Children from the ages of 4 to 6 years were 
able to differentiate happy, sad, fearful and angry FEE at levels well above chance, and their 
accuracy improved with age (Masters & Carlson, 1988). By age 8, children were able to make 
subtle distinctions between closely related emotional states and identify the affective states of 
others with some degree of accuracy (Brown, 1993). Furthermore, children at about age ten 
were essentially perfect in their identification of happiness, sadness, anger and fear (Masters & 
Carlson, 1988). Collectively, the preceding discussion suggests that by adolescence a child 
normally possesses a highly developed ability to express a variety o f facial emotions and a 
perceptual system to reliably detect basic FEE (Brown, 1993). It also stands to reason that 
flawed development may link components of emotional development in unexpected ways so 
that expected organization (e.g., expression, perception) may not occur consistently or perform 
adequately (Harris, 1995b).
Emotional Regulation and Dvsreeulation
A well developed emotional system includes an ability to accomplish and experience a 
balanced regulation of emotion. The implicit notion of emotional regulation is that everyone
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has a similar variety of emotions that function at optimal levels (i.e., intensities, duration, 
patterns) (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). From a differential perspective, basic emotions have three 
fundamental, genetically determined components: conscious feeling of emotion, FEE, and 
neural substrate (Thompson, 1988). A basic feeling such as anger, the FEE of anger, the neural 
circuitry producing the physiological pattern associated with anger, and the stimulation needed 
to elicit anger reflect a fundamental genetic influence. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect 
that one’s emotional response to environmental stimuli can be understood at different levels.
For example, responses can be measured by way of variable heart rate, cortisol levels, various 
facial expressions and feeling states (Harris, 1995a).
Varying degrees of emotional regulation may occur within or between these factors. It 
is interesting that by 2 years of age children use terms to denote emotion and that by age 3 make 
causal statements of emotion (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). As children age they use language to 
understand and gain control over their emotions. Uninhibited anger and fhistration decreases 
sharply in the second year of life and declines in the third as children learn to regulate their 
emotion by communicating their feelings (Harris, 1995a).
The literature also notes that children 4 and 5 years of age demonstrated appropriate 
emotional regulation while at play (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). For example, happy expressions 
elicited gestures o f sharing, anger resulted in negative verbal and physical responses, and 
expressions of hurt or pain garnered reassurance. From this it is evident that children respond 
in different ways to different emotion displays.
The likelihood of an innate regulatory mechanism is evidenced by the capacity of 
emotions to regulate one another (Harris, 1995a). For example, anger attenuates fear and 
sadness. This can influence perceptual and cognitive informational processing systems that 
may in turn activate another emotion. Such emotional regulation in infants may explain some
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of their behavior, such as turning away from objects, self-soothing by sucking vigorously on 
objects, rocking and so forth (Shaffer, 1996).
Temperament is also important in emotional regulation. There is agreement that 
temperament is frmdamentally biologically based (Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995; Prior, 1992), with 
constitutional differences in reactivity and self-regulation (e.g., facial expressions, 
cardiovascular activity, and threshold parameters) (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988). One’s 
temperament organizes the expression of emotions and plays a role in how emotions are 
expressed. Regarding FEE, children have characteristic styles or biases of emotionality that 
influence emotional patterns beginning in childhood and continuing through adulthood (Oatley 
& Jenkins, 1996). Thus, the regulatory system of temperament plays a critical role in 
coordinating attention and response and influences nearly every aspect of experience and 
behavior (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988).
A problem may arise when an individual’s repetitive pattern of emotional responding 
becomes overly biased and the person develops a disruptive temperament. For example, 
individuals who maintain a predominantly angry or fearful pattern of responding, compared to a 
flexible, adaptive emotional style, are often restricted in their emotional regulation and 
maladapted in their disposition (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992).
Physiological evidence implicates the circuitry of the limbic system and reticular 
activating system as involved in temperament (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988). The feedforward 
and feedback projections between these structures and the cortex accomplish multidimensional 
adjustments of cortical pathways. That is, neural activity gives rise to subtle modulation 
processes that adjust the target systems’ reactivity to incoming signals. The resulting pattern of 
reactivity may serve to bias or narrow the flow of information (Coren & Ward, 1989).
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Approaching temperament in terms of the ‘systems’ reactivity’ suggests that ease and 
flexibility of the attentional focus is disengaged and reoriented (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988). 
Failure at one stage of regulation development can have implications for the success of 
regulating at other stages. This can result in an emotion response system that is less able to 
effectively facilitate coping (Harris, 1995a) because of deficits that manifest in one or more 
areas such as expression, experience, and perception of emotion (Brown, 1993). For example, 
conduct disorder, and its adult counterpart, antisocial personality disorder, involve a 
predominance of anger and are considered to be examples of chronic dysregulation of anger 
(Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). The result is an inability to regulate emotional responses to 
provocative situations and leads to social incompetence and maladaptation (Harris, 1995a).
Good examples of aberrant FEE expressiveness and recognition have been found in 
studies of depression. Individuals with depression generally display a bias toward expressing 
more sadness. Furthermore, they demonstrate an impaired ability to decode facial expressions 
accurately, especially sadness and happiness, resulting in a negative emotional bias both in the 
perception of self and others (Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999; Bradley et al, 1997; Hale, 
1998; Rubinow & Post, 1992).
Studies of patients with brain injury have established the role of the orbital frontal lobes 
in emotion regulation (Edwards-Lee & Saul, 1999). Lesions on the right lead to more mania 
and lesions on the left to more depression. It has been suggested that relative right frontal lobe 
activation reflects innate biological differences related to a vulnerability to experience certain 
negative emotions in stressful situations, such as a lower threshold for experiencing sadness 
(Dawson, 1994). Transcraniai magnetic stimulation studies eliciting transient hypofunctioning 
showed that hypofunctioning in the left but not right prefrontal area resulted in decreased self- 
reported happiness and a significant increase in sadness ratings (Edwards-Lee & Saul, 1999).
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Such findings support the paramount importance of varied aspects of the brain with regard to 
emotion.
Hemispheric Asymmetry of Facial Emotion
The right brain hemisphere has frequently been attributed as having a dominant or 
special role in the perception and expression of facial emotion (Asthana & Mandai, 1997; 
Borod, Koff, Lorch, & Nicholas, 1986; Damasio, 1994). Studies of che putative predominance 
of the right hemisphere in FEE recognition tests have resulted in mixed findings (Young, 1995). 
Some research has shown opposite findings wherein the left hemisphere produced results 
typically anticipated from the right (Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993). 
Furthermore, processing of facial emotions may not necessarily be the exclusive function of the 
right hemisphere (Mandai, Asthana, & Maitra, 1998).
The investigation of hemispheric asymmetry in emotion has led to the proposal of 
several models that explain how the brain mediates emotions in humans (Lane, Reiman, Ahem, 
Schwartz, & Davidson. 1997). One model suggests that the right hemisphere mediates all basic 
emotions. Another proposes that emotions are organized differently accordingly to valence, 
with positive emotions mediated by the left hemisphere and negative emotions by the right. A 
third posits that emotions are lateralized in regard to the associated motor responses, for 
example approach emotions (e.g., happy) are lateralized to the left hemisphere and withdrawal 
emotions (e.g., fear) to the right.
However, a recent study showed that FEE information for most basic emotions is 
processed more accurately when both the componential (relatively more left hemisphere) and 
configurai (relatively more right hemisphere) processes function in parallel (Mandai et al., 
1998). ADHD research suggests that these individuals make more FEE perception errors than 
normal because they only attend to the face as a whole (Oades, 1998; Singh et al., 1998). To
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accurately identify emotion one must pay attention to the individual parts of the face that 
provide differentiating cues. This requires an appropriate level and focus of attention. The 
right hemisphere shows some superiority in processing complex FEE that requires greater 
visuo-spatial (parietal lobe, dorsal visual stream function) processing in addition to emotional 
processing. This suggests that the right hemisphere plays a role in face perception in addition to 
its involvement in basic visual abilities.
Neurological Substrates of Facial Emotion
Since Papez proposed his theory of the ‘limbic lobe’ as the anatomical basis for emotion 
and the discovery that temporal lobe damage produces several behavior changes including flat 
affect (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996), notions related to the ‘emotional brain’ have become more 
evident in the literature.
One such notion questions whether emotion is mediated by separate neural substrates, 
sharing different regions within the same structures, or whether there is a single system for 
processing all emotion. Although the current map of the emotion-CNS relationship remains 
crude (Thompson, 1988), there is increasing evidence about selective neuronal responses to 
various facial stimuli (Prkachin & Prkachin, 1994, under review; Streit et al., 1999). The 
argument is made that different sets of components affect different emotions (Adolphs et al,
1996); however, consistent findings about the specific brain areas involved in emotion remain 
to be clearly established (George et al., 1998). To the extent that there are neural substrates of 
emotion, one might expect these substrates to include templates for specific emotions, or some 
of the so-called basic emotions.
Research supports at least a partially distinguishable emotion substrate mediating system 
(Lane, Reiman, & Bradley et al., 1997). Participants viewing FEE in neuroimaging studies 
showed differential activation o f the left medial temporal lobe, bilateral occipital-temporal
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cortex, and cerebellum depending on whether the expression was unpleasant, neutral, or 
pleasant. Activation of the caudate nucleus, head of the basal ganglia, occurred when pleasant 
emotions were viewed. This did not occur when subjects viewed unpleasant and neutral 
emotions. These results suggest that the aforementioned structures are fundamental in the 
emotion mediation network with differential involvement dependent on the emotion.
Support for an emotion substrate model comes from consistent findings of uneven 
impairment of FEE perception concerning fear, anger, and especially disgust in studies of 
Huntington’s disease (Broks et al., 1998; Gray, Young, Barker, Curtis, & Gibson, 1997; 
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997). Neuroimaging has revealed that Huntington’s disease is associated 
with atrophy of the parietal, frontal, temporal and occipital regions, and the caudate nuclei 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997). Impairment of disgust perception has been associated with 
caudate nuclei damage while impairment of fear and anger perception has been attributed to 
bilateral amygdala damage and atrophy of the temporal lobe caused by the disease. Findings 
related to FEE recognition impairments associated with Huntington’s disease support the 
possibility that some of the basic emotions may have dedicated neural substrates (Gray et al.,
1997).
Neuroanatomical correlates have been identified, using PET, not only for disgust, but 
also for happiness and sadness (Lane, Reiman, & Ahem et al., 1997). The medial prefrontal 
cortex and thalamus seem to be activated in all three emotions regardless of induction method. 
The anterior and posterior temporal cortex appear to participate in all aspects o f these emotions 
when they are film-generated. The ventral medial frontal cortex seems to be differentially 
activated depending on the valence of the emotion. Furthermore, the anterior insular cortex was 
differentially involved in certain aspects of negative emotion only. In short, prefrontal cortex 
and thalamus activation appear to be common to all three emotions, the caudate nucleus and
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putamen are associated with sadness and disgust, and the anterior insular cortex appears to be 
sensitive to the type of emotion and the nature of the emotional stimulus.
Use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has also highlighted a possible 
neural substrate for the perception of happy facial expressions (Phillips et al., 1998). This 
technology detects signal increases predominantly in the left anterior cingulate gyrus, bilateral 
posterior cingulate gyri, medial frontal cortex and right supramarginal gyrus. These limbic 
structures were previously thought to be involved in visuospatial and emotion processing tasks. 
However, fMRI studies that include other FEE are required to confirm these findings and clarify 
the nature of the neural substrates in perception of distinct facial emotion.
Another example of the emotion substrate hypothesis comes from the study of fear.
Fear is possibly the most basic of cross-species emotions, evident in almost all animal groups as 
a common life experience. As a result, it is probably the best understood and most extensively 
and successfully researched emotion in relation to associated neurology (LeDoux, 1994). Much 
of our current understanding of the potential relationship of neuronal substrates to emotion 
relies on studies of fear (Prkachin, in preparation).
What is known about fear may serve as a conceptual model of how other emotions are 
associated with neurological and psychological functions. It is likely that other emotional 
expressions involve somewhat different neuronal processes (Prkachin, under review). The most 
consistent findings of a neural substrate for fear indicate an association between fear and the 
amygdala (LeDoux, 1992), areas o f the superior temporal gyrus, inferior posterior temporal 
gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and the medial frontal cortex (Phillips et al., 1998). Central to 
this association is whether the amygdala is involved in emotions other than fear and whether 
uni- or bilateral damage is necessary to impair the ability to recognize facial expressions of fear 
(Calder et al., 1996; Gottman, 1993).
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Similar to impairment in recognizing fear, problems with recognition of other emotions, 
specifically anger and disgust, appear to result from damage to the amygdala, at least in cases 
where there has been extensive temporal lobe damage (Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996) 
that is sometimes associated with right parietal cortices (Adolphs et al., 1996). However, 
decreased recognition of anger and disgust from facial expressions is usually only evidenced in 
comparison to a differential impairment in recognizing fear. This is interesting in that difficulty 
identifying the same three emotions has been observed in cases of Huntington’s disease, 
implying damage beyond the temporal lobe (Gray et al., 1997; Rolls, 1990; Sprengelmeyer et 
al., 1997). This may suggest that FEE perception deficits found in amygdala damage 
(differentially impairing fear recognition) and Huntington’s disease (differentially impairing 
disgust recognition) share some neurological overlap, or, that cases with extensive temporal 
lobe damage and cases of Huntington’s disease interconnect through some other neurological 
structure, resulting in common FEE recognition deficits that are differential in severity.
Studies of the amygdala have shown this structure to have complex neural inputs from 
and outputs to numerous cortical and subcortical areas, such as the thalamus and STS 
(Aggleton, 1993; LeDoux, 1992,1993b; Rolls, 1995; Young, Hellawell, van de Wal, & 
Johnson, 1996). In light of such interconnections, these structures are likely key in mediating 
fear, anger and disgust and are co-associated in the recognition impairment o f these emotions. 
However, research still needs to establish if  any discrete cells within these areas are linked to 
selective FEE perception impairments (Pricachin, in preparation).
Although the amygdala has been portrayed as a key component (Rolls, 1995), it would 
be inaccurate to consider it the centerpiece’ of the brain’s emotional system, especially 
concerning emotions other than fear (LeDoux, 1995; Thompson, 1988). The amygdala’s 
mediation capacity is limited by its crude structure and function (LeDoux, 1993b) and it is
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essentially one part in a larger neurological organization (Thompson, 1988). Furthermore, the 
literature includes cases where the amygdala was not damaged and fear recognition impairment 
was caused by bilateral neocortical damage (Broks et al., 1998) as well as reports of bilateral 
amygdala damage where fear recognition impairment was not conspicuous in the testing 
(Hamann et al., 1996). These mixed findings indicate that bilateral amygdala damage does not 
inevitably or invariably interfere with the recognition o f FEE. They also imply that amygdala 
damage may not be a required or sufficient condition to impair facial recognition of fear or 
other emotions. This suggests that emotion is not necessarily mediated by a general system but 
rather by different substrates for different emotions or clusters of emotions (Thompson, 1988).
It also implies that emotions are likely distributed throughout reciprocally acting subcortical and 
cortical regions (Dawson, 1994; Streit et al., 1999). However, the amygdala seems to be more 
specific to stimulus-reward association formations related to conditioned fear, at least in 
animals (LeDoux, 1993b).
Neurophvsioloeical Associations with Facial Emotion
Components of emotion in addition to the particular hypothesized central nervous 
system substrate structures have been proposed. Nearly all twentieth-century theories of human 
emotion postulate some type of connection between emotion and physiological activity 
(Thompson, 1988). Physiological activation is present, to some degree, in response to internal 
(e.g., imagined) experience or external stimuli (e.g., sighting a bear). Therefore, body responses 
are associated with emotion in some manner (Strongman, 1996; Thompson, 1988), with FEE 
often inducing an emotional state and a response FEE by the observer (Prkachin & Pricachin, 
under review).
It has been demonstrated that, for example, voluntarily posed FEE resulted in distinct 
stereotyped pattems of involuntary autonomic nervous system (ANS) and
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electroencephalograph (EEG) activity patterns for some of the universal basic emotions, 
specifically anger, fear, disgust, and possibly sadness. The same distinct pattems also were 
found across cultures, thus establishing emotion-specific ANS activity associations (Camras et 
al., 1993; Ekman, 1992a, 1992b; Thompson, 1988).
Other research found cardiovascular activity differences between the basic emotions in a 
directed facial action task (Levenson, 1992). For example, anger, fear and sadness were 
associated with greater heart rate acceleration than disgust, and anger produced greater finger 
temperature increases than produced by fear. Different heart rates result between positive and 
negative emotions in that greater acceleration occurred in relation to fear and anger than 
happiness. Vascular differences were also observed. For example, fear showed lower diastolic 
blood measures, cooler skin surface temperatures, and greater vascular constriction. 
Interestingly, the closer the approximation to the prototypical FEE, the more pronounced the 
vascular differences. Regardless of whether these changes fiilly discriminate the emotion, 
autonomic activity can lead to different emotional percepts, primarily dependent on the 
elaboration of cognitive evaluations (Cacioppo et al., 1993).
It has been purported that body states are an important emotion component. The relative 
combination o f ANS, viscera, motor system, and biochemical arousal and activation places the 
body in a state commonly associated with a triggering event (Damasio, 1994). As FEE 
recognition likely leads to retrieval of relevant information firom the diverse neural system that 
serves emotion, past body states have been identified as an important information component 
(Adolphs et al., 1996). These states likely rely on associated autonomic and somatovisceral 
activity information. Relative inability to access this information would likely diminish or 
impair FEE recognition performance.
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Another interesting postulation has been that ‘feelings’ are what one experiences, the 
existential nexus, in the course o f forming a body state to a stimulus (Damasio, 1994). That is, 
feeling the emotion as described in the aforementioned somatovisceral activity. A feeling can 
be a motivator in guiding behavior as well as providing a somatovisceral frame of reference 
(e.g., “somatic marker.” Damasio, 1994, p. 173) for future behavior (Levenson, 1992). This 
occurs regardless of whether feelings are considered a discrete autonomic-somatovisceral 
profile o f the emotion or an undifferentiated arousal experience that serves an attentional 
purpose for the broader cognitive system.
Alexithvmia and the Perception of Facial Expressions and Emotional Regulation
Alexithymia presents an interesting neuropsychological phenomenon that adds to the 
understanding of emotion. Persons with alexithymia demonstrate a deficit in their ability to 
verbally describe or label emotion. They also appear to have difficulty experiencing emotion, 
or at least they appear as emotionally blunted or flat (Haviland & Reise, 1996; Lane, Ahem, 
Schwartz, & Kaszniak, 1997; Lane et al., 1996; Roedema & Simons, 1999). In alexithymia, 
there seems to be an apparent disconnectivity between the labeled emotion, the somatovisceral 
and autonomic components of the emotion, and the triggering event; that is, those with this 
disorder lack a cohesive, conscious emotional experience or awareness o f emotional activity 
(Lane, Ahem, & Schwartz et al., 1997; Lane et al., 1996). Thus the impact of this deficit 
reaches beyond vocabulary impairment.
It has been suggested that the anterior cingulate cortex contributes to the orchestration 
and modulation of motor, neuroendocrine, and autonomic activities related to emotion through 
its feedforward and feedback connections. The anterior cingulate cortex has complex 
interactive neural cormections with the somatosensory cortex, basal ganglia, temporal lobe, and 
subcortical structures involved in bodystate activities (e.g., with the amygdala, hippocampus,
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thalamus, hypothalamus). The ‘attentional spotlight’ for these stimuli (e.g., somato visceral and 
autonomic) could be a function of the anterior cingulate cortex, helping to select emotion 
relevant body state information, and providing a frame of reference to enhance transference of 
this information to explicit conscious awareness processes (e.g., frontal lobe) (Lane, Ahem, & 
Schwartz et al., 1997).
The degree o f functional impairment of the anterior cingulate cortex may be related to a 
deficit in one’s capacity for interoceptive perception o f emotion relevant information. This 
could lead to the breakdown in connecting one’s body sensation to an emotional state or feeling 
emotions to a lesser degree. In alexithymia, the proposed attentional function of the anterior 
cingulate cortex may fail to contribute to the conjunction of labeled emotion and the body state 
of arousal. Beyond a perceptual problem, alexithymia may be an affective impairment of the 
degree to which one processes (i.e., experiences) emotion, thus resulting in a deficient cognitive 
appreciation of FEE.
Research suggests that physiological activity associated with basic emotions provides at 
least an immediate and spontaneous awareness, and often an indelible and enhanced intuitive 
sensory memory about the relationship between oneself and some stimulus. This is similar to 
what has been proposed as ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 1998). These are images that result 
from somatosensory patterns and mark the related stimulus situation as good or bad, thus 
metaphorically creating a decision-making space that is constrained, manageable and cost 
effective.
The labeling o f emotion deficit experienced by persons with alexithymia presents a 
different kind of challenge in FEE recognition. Although these individuals exhibit difficulty in 
labeling emotion (nouns) they do not demonstrate a deficit in using nonemotion nouns. Why? 
The argument that right hemisphere dysregulation is associated with alexithymia appears to be
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widely accepted in the literature (Jessimer & Maricham, 1997). Moreover, there is likely a 
dysfunction of the complex neural network (crossroads) between the anterior cingulate cortex, 
temporal (STS), parietal (PG) and occipital lobes, (initiating the dorsal and ventral visual 
streams) that subserves the perception of FEE.
Given that the visual system is functioning normally, from retina through tectum and 
thalamus, the problem of labeling emotions must originate ‘downstream.’ Area PG (spatial) of 
parietal lobe (located by the supramarginal gyrus) responds to input from visual (occipital lobe) 
and somatosensory areas and the anterior cingulate cortex. Spatial capacity is likely involved 
with FEE perception through the feature spatial configuration and relationship. Furthermore, 
cells in the temporal lobe are sensitive for FEE recognition. The STS (in the posterior temporal 
cortex) is a key site for polymodal input and intermodal combining from verbal, auditory, visual 
and somatosensory systems. This likely underlies stimulus categorization and assignment of 
phonemic tags to emotion categories.
The above activity, largely implicit, is likely part of the discrimination of emotions. 
However, its effectiveness is greatly enhanced by language, which transforms knowledge from 
implicit to explicit, thus modifying the allocation of attentional resources in the anterior 
cingulate cortex. Words denoting emotion create cognitive schemata that further determine 
how emotion relevant information is processed. Failure to provide effective neuronal 
differentiation for competing stimuli (emotion relevant visual and language information) 
required for further ‘conscious’ processing (e.g., prefrontal cortex feedforward and feedback 
processes) may diminish one’s capacity to describe FEE. This also confounds the conscious 
experience of what the FEE represents.
Individuals with right frontal lobe damage exhibit impaired verbal expression of 
emotion (Edwards-Lee & Saul, 1999). They use less appropriate emotional words and words
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with lower emotional intensity when describing emotional situations. Furthermore, emotional 
words were processed more accurately when presented in the left visual field, supporting the 
relationship between alexithymia and neurologically based emotional impairments.
Those with alexithymia also present a picture of emotional dysregulation. They have 
difficulty in accurately perceiving FEE (Duchesneau, 1996; Jessimer & Markham, 1997), and 
demonstrate an impaired capacity to empathize with others (Parker et al., 1993). These 
individuals experience difficulty with affect verbalization as well as restricted physiological 
arousal and sensations (Roedema & Simons, 1999). There is also an indication that they 
experience violent outbursts (Kroner & Forth, 1995). Such dysregulation may result in failure 
to consistently recognize specific emotions (Brown, 1993). It also appears that alexithymia 
traits are similar to those of anorexia nervosa, bulimia, substance abuse, and post traumatic 
stress disorder (Salminen, Saarijarvi, & Aarela, 1995). As such, alexithymia may be a 
secondary phenomenon resulting from significant psychological trauma during critical 
developmental periods in childhood or major catastrophes in adult life (Duchesneau, 1996; 
Salminen et al., 1995).
Research has also shown that the construct of (high) alexithymia is related to the 
emotionally based aggression of violent offenders and dimensions of psychopathology (Kroner 
& Forth, 1995). There seems to be a relationship between the inability to monitor one’s level of 
emotional excitement during interactions and physical aggression, causing these individuals to 
fail to withdraw firom conflict in social situations. This suggests that those who are unaware of 
expressed hostility will maintain hostile feelings whereas those experiencing an adequate level 
of awareness will modulate hostile feelings and reduce aggressive outbursts.
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Literature Review of Neuropsychological Deficits Associated 
with Incarcerated Youth
Serious conduct problems are the most common reason for child referral to inpatient and 
outpatient psychiatric treatment facilitates (Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995), accounting for up to one- 
half of all child and adolescent clinic referrals (Webster-Stratton, 1993). Children with serious 
conduct problems are extremely disruptive. They exhibit high rates of antisocial behavior such 
as noncompliance and defiance, aggression and cruelty towards people and animals. 
Furthermore, they engage in destructive acts, lying, stealing, running away and cheating, that are 
clinically significant and clearly beyond the realm of ‘normal’ functioning. These behaviors 
bring many such individuals into contact with the criminal justice system (Kazdin, 1997). 
Moreover, these behaviors are not mitigated by maturity but are highly predictive of significant 
behavior problems in adolescence and adulthood (Phelps & McClintock, 1994), remaining 
stable over time and across situations (Moffitt, 1993b). This behavioral profile is common in 
incarcerated youth. Hence, they present a significant general concern and a potentially 
interesting neuropsychology. Unfortunately, very limited attention has been focused on mental 
health problems experienced by incarcerated youth (Ulzen & Hamilton, 1998).
The prevalence of the extreme form of problem behavior, conduct disorder (CD), in 
children aged 4 to 18 years has recently been estimated to range from 4% to 16% in boys and 
2% to 9% in girls. It has been suggested that many of these youth are responsible for 
approximately 50% to 60% of known crimes (Lynam, 1996; Moffitt, 1993b). It also estimated 
that up to 87% of incarcerated youth (aged 11 to 17) meet the diagnosis criteria for CD 
(Eppright, Kashani, Robinson, & Reid, 1993). Although the professional nomenclature may 
change, the faces remain the same as these youth drift through successive systems aimed at 
addressing their deviance. As such, there is growing interest about neuropsychological factors
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that appear to put children at risk for serious problem, delinquent behavior (Eme & Kavanaugh, 
1995; Lyons et al., 1995; Moffitt, 1997; Webster-Stratton, 1993).
The literature shows that up to 85% of convicted felons are eligible for antisocial 
personality disorder (APD) diagnosis (Lynam, 1996). Among professionals it is generally 
accepted that 40% to 50% of children with CD become recidivist criminals and/or adults with 
APD (Werry, 1997). However, recent argument has been made that this percentage is too 
conservative given that all adults with APD have a history of CD. Moreover, further study of 
children with CD is likely to confirm that a greater percentage than previously estimated will 
develop APD in adulthood (Werry, 1997). In addition, when all diagnoses are considered in 
conjunction with CD, 84% of the full sample of subjects received a psychiatric diagnosis as 
adults and demonstrated continued dyshmction, criminal behavior and social maladjustment 
(Kazdin, 1997).
Associated Neuroosvchological Deficits
One of the most robust findings related to antisocial behavior is that children who 
persistently exhibit these behaviors suffer from neuropsychological deficits, especially in 
relation to executive control, verbal, visual spatial functioning and other learning disabilities 
(Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995; Moffitt, 1993a; Moffitt, 1997). These deficits have statistical 
variance that is independent of social class, race, test motivation, and academic attainment. 
Furthermore, these deficits are clearly related to underlying neuropsychological functioning, by 
definition. Specifically, these impairments have been hypothesized as etiological factors related 
to developmental problems, such as ADHD and learning difficulties, that may put children at 
risk o f antisocial and delinquent behavior.
At the basic level, biological processes are involved in the way children and adolescents 
learn, remember, think, make choices and so on. Biological factors that threaten emotional,
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behavioral and cognitive functions, reduce overall competence or exacerbate behaviour 
problems are the most significant in creating a risk o f delinquency (Conger & Simons, 1997).
In fact, it has been estimated that children with central nervous system (CNS) damage have five 
times the incidence of CD (Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994).
Attention Deficit Hvneractivitv Disorder
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a very significant predictor and 
comorbid condition of serious conduct problems, including criminal behavior (Barkley, 1990; 
Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995; Fomess, Kavale, King, & Kasari, 1994; Hinshaw, 1994; Hinshaw, 
Lahey, & Hart, 1993; Horacek, 1998; Kazdin, 1997; Loeber & Keenan, 1994; Mandel, 1997). It 
is noteworthy that a large percentage of children (up to 75%) diagnosed with significant conduct 
problems typically met the diagnostic criteria for ADHD (Fomess et al., 1994; Kazdin, 1997; 
Zubieta & Alessi, 1993). Moreover, reports also show that up to 75% of children diagnosed 
with ADHD have been diagnosed with serious conduct problems (Webster-Stratton, 1993). 
Exclusion of those with ADHD from the research would significantly impact what is known 
about the neuropsychological features of children who exhibit serious behavior problems 
(Hooper & Tramontana, 1997). Children with comorbid ADHD and conduct problems exhibit, 
for example, more physical aggression, more persistent and varied antisocial activity, increased 
underachievement and learning problems. Furthermore, they have higher rejection rates from 
peers, and increased police contacts, criminal offences and incarcerations (Lynam, 1996) 
relative to children who exhibit comorbidity of conduct problems with other symptom clusters 
(Hinshaw et al., 1993).
These challenging and problematic behavior pattems are prominent and persistent in 
incarcerated youth. In addition, it appears that affect discrimination may be dysfunctional in 
ADHD children and adolescents, evidenced in deficits related to the perception, interpretation
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and labeling o f FEE (Allison, 1997; Corbett, 1998; Harris, 1995a; Ingram, 1996; Singh et al., 
1998). It is conceivable that such deficits could exacerbate the risk of conduct problems by 
maintaining and intensifying a dysfunctional social awareness that contributes to subsequent 
externalized misbehavior. Furthermore, dysfunctional social awareness appears to contribute to 
disinhibited behavior pattems in youth, increasing the frequency and severity of their delinquent 
behavior, and strengthening the likelihood that they will maintain a pattern of conduct problems 
(Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995).
A hypofrontality associated with ADHD has been confirmed, suggesting reduced global 
glucose metabolism (gCBF) and regional glucose metabolism (rCBF) (Harris, 1995a; Horacek,
1998). One of the most significant reductions is in the superior prefrontal cortical areas, 
important in attentional processes. In ADHD adolescents, rCBF is decreased bilaterally in the 
striatal region as well as in the frontal, temporal, and thalamic areas (Harris, 1995a). 
Furthermore, hypoactivity is evidenced in the right medial fi-ontal cortex, right inferior 
prefrontal cortex, left caudate nucleus and cingulate area (Rubia et al., 1999). Other research 
revealed that the genu of the corpus collosum has been observed (via MRI) to be smaller in 
persons with ADHD, potentially limiting relaying and integration of information between both 
the left and right frontal cortical areas (Horacek, 1998). ADHD is also associated with an 
asymmetry in the cortico*striatal network and atrophy in the right hemisphere (Oades, 1998; 
Papa, Berger, Sagvolden, Sergeant & Sadile, 1994). Animal research supports human ADHD 
studies, implicating the abnormal functioning of the basal ganglia and their connections to the 
orbito-frontal and limbic structures in attention deficits (Papa et al., 1994). It is within reason to 
suspect that brain physiological and functional anomalies experienced by persons with ADHD 
could also affect the perception o f FEE, as implied earlier.
32
Lower than normal blood flow in the basal ganglia has been observed in children and 
adolescents with ADHD; this may be associated with some of the brain function anomalies of 
the disorder (Copeland, 1991; Rubia et al., 1999). Some functions of the basal ganglia (e.g., 
integration, coordination, and transmission of stimuli) are not only implicated as involved in the 
ADHD phenomenon (Copeland, 1991) but are also a neurological piece in the emotion system 
of FEE impairments (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996; Lane, Ahem, & Schwartz et al., 1997).
The degree of developmental functioning (e.g., developmental lag) o f the reticular 
activation system (RAS) may also contribute to some aspects of ADHD (Copeland, 1991). This 
subcortical structure is best understood for its arousal or modification of brain functioning. It 
has a diffuse neural system that extends to the thalamus and gives rise to important ascending 
and descending systems (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). The reticular system is not fully connected 
to the limbic system until adolescence. This connection completes later for persons with 
ADHD than it does for their peers (Copeland, 1991) and potentially contributes to a 
hypofunctioning affective system. It may also result in a particular reactivity pattern that limits 
or biases the flow of information and affects the perception of FEE (Coren & Ward, 1989).
Persons with ADHD experience increased difficulty in scanning and selecting relevant 
aspects of stimuli (Oie & Rund, 1999). They notice fewer targets, make more perceptual errors, 
and have reduced reaction times, factors that have been associated with at least fronto-striatal 
dysfunction (Oades, 1998). Therefore, at minimum, persons with ADHD exhibit 
developmental anomalies in the fironto-striatal neural networks associated with varying degrees 
of attending problems. One of the problems has been the correct perception o f FEE (Singh et 
al., 1998).
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Learning and Language Deficits
Other well researched factors associated with antisocial behavior are skills involving 
expressive and receptive language, problem solving, and visual spatial ability. It is commonly 
understood that the ability to communicate effectively facilitates social behavior. Research has 
shown that up to 75% of children with language deficits (Copeland, 1991) and up to 80% of 
children with learning disorders (Sprouse, Hall, Webster, & Bolen, 1998) referred for clinical 
services also had ADHD. While little is known about how deficits and disorders are 
intertwined, it is clearly indicated that a significant number of children struggle with 
overlapping language and learning deficits and behavior disorders (Copeland, 1991 ; Donahue, 
Cole, & Hartas, 1994). The data suggests that the linkages between these problems are more 
specifically associated with attention deficits (Hinshaw, 1994). This link between 
neuropsychological impairment and antisocial behaviors is a very robust finding. Furthermore, 
there is strong evidence that such deficits in early childhood are linked to persistent and extreme 
antisocial behavior (Moffitt, 1993a, 1997). For example, lesions in the left firontal lobe and the 
connection to the limbic system may be causal in verbal skill deficits commonly exhibited by 
children with serious conduct problems (Mandel, 1997).
Research consistently shows that at least 50% of children with behavioral problems also 
exhibit significant language deficits (Donahue et al., 1994). Moreover, it suggests that language 
disorders were found in 80% of antisocial boys in residential treatment, likely representative of 
the most severe antisocial cases. Difficulty in social communication with one’s peers, parents, 
teachers and others has been noted as one o f the most critical risk factors for conduct problems 
that could ultimately develop into persistent antisocial behaviors in adulthood (Moffitt, Lynam, 
& Silva, 1994).
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The co-occurrence of these deficits with conduct problems seems to signify an important 
and complex developmental course for childhood onset antisocial behavior, likely having a 
fundamental underlying neuropsychological explanation. Cognitive impairments, especially 
those related to verbal skills, increase the probability of children acting impulsively as they 
struggle to emotionally regulate stressful or provocative situations (Hooper & Tramontana,
1997). It has been found that delinquents are less accurate than nondelinquents in applying 
verbal labels to the emotional states of others when asked to identify expressed emotions 
displayed in videotaped vignettes (Savitsky & Czyzewski, 1978). Furthermore, these labeling 
problems have been associated with alexithymia in serious adult criminal offenders (Roedema 
& Simons, 1999). Persons with alexithymia demonstrate difficulty in accurately perceiving 
FEE (Duchesneau, 1996; Jessimer & Markham, 1997; Parker et al., 1993) and impaired 
capacity to empathize with others (Parker et al., 1993). They also experience restricted 
physiological arousal and are prone to violent outbursts (Kroner & Forth, 1995). While no 
research on alexithymia in populations of incarcerated youth has been published to date, such a 
disorder, including difficulties in accurately perceiving FEE, may be a risk factor for 
delinquency.
Social skills depend not only on one’s language development and learning capacity but 
also involve the ability to discriminate nonverbal social cues. For example, social-emotive 
signals for accurate social understanding involve specific pattems of facial movements thought 
to require specialized brain processing mechanisms that reside in the right hemisphere (Harris, 
1995a). Children with learning disorders exhibit deficits in decoding nonverbal cues, a 
purported relative right hemisphere pathology. It is not surprising that they experience more 
relationship and teacher interaction problems, have fewer fiiends, and exhibit other 
interpersonal difficulties that persist into adulthood (Sprouse et al., 1998). The ability of
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children with nonverbal learning disabilities to accurately perceive the emotions and feelings of 
others from facial expressions is diminished compared to those without learning disabilities 
(Harris, 1995a; Holder & Kirkpatrick, 1991). Furthermore, reduced attention to evaluating 
displayed expressions resulted in greater difficulty in the perception of FEE (Harris, 1995a; 
Holder & Kirkpatrick, 1991). Although a smirk and a smile are similar in appearance, they 
deliver different information. The ability to distinguish between the two is essential to making 
correct inferences and responding appropriately. However, with inadequate social perception, 
self-correction is limited, resulting in disturbed and problematic social interactions.
Learning disabilities, language delays, and attention deficits appear to be significantly 
related to conduct problems (Webster-Stratton, 1993). The specific association between these 
problems is thought to be linked through ADHD (Hinshaw et al., 1993; Hinshaw, 1994). This 
key role is supported in the literature and relates to the history of neurological developmental 
problems that increase a child’s vulnerability to the development of serious conduct problems 
(Eme & Kavanaugh, 1995; Mandel, 1997; Moffitt, 1993b). Such findings suggest that 
observable behavior is linked to the physical health of the brain (Moffitt et al., 1994).
The Bioloev of Difficult Temperament: Emotional Dvsreeulation
As previously mentioned, temperament has also been implicated in the etiology of 
serious conduct problems, including dysfunctional emotional processes. Biological variations 
contribute to difficult temperament and are responsible for the increased prevalence of serious 
conduct problems. This ‘child deficit’ hypothesis argues that an abnormal aspect of the child’s 
internal organization at the neurophysiological and neuropsychological level is at least partially 
responsible for the development of externalized problem behavior.
Research in temperamental characteristics foretells specific troublesome attributes that 
are highly associated with behavior problems. One such attribute has been described as
36
insufficient control (Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, & Silva, 1995). Children with insufficient 
control reflect an inability to modulate impulsive expression, are impersistent in problem 
solving, and react with negatively charged emotion. This characteristic is significantly 
associated with reports of antisocial behavior in late childhood.
Recent research supports high impulsivity as the strongest personality predictor of 
delinquent behavior (Tremblay, Pihl, Vitaro, & Dobkin, 1994). This presents a clear overlap 
with findings previously noted relative to ADHD and CD. More specifically, it suggests that 
high impulsivity in kindergarten aged boys was highly predictive of later childhood antisocial 
behavior. It also suggests that impulsivity is linked to an abnormally functioning behavior 
activation system relating to temperament factors in CD. Furthermore, this research confirmed 
the prediction that young persons high in impulsivity, low in anxiety, and low in reward 
dependence were at the greatest risk for antisocial behavior.
Impulsivity is not the only link to the greater prevalence of serious conduct problems. 
Autonomic underarousal, perhaps linked to low anxiety, is characteristically exhibited by 
children who express extreme antisocial, violent behavior and later psychopathology (Zahn- 
Waxier, Cole, Welsh, & Fox, 1995). Of interest is how such children act towards, feel, think 
about, and viscerally experience distressing emotions in others. Low heart rate, decreased skin 
conductance response (SCRs) amplitudes and recovery time to base line readings are sensitive 
indices of ANS anomalies (i.e., underarousal) evidenced by individuals with CD and APD, and 
to a lesser degree by criminals in general (Ellis, 1987; Lynam, 1996; Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994; 
Scarpa & Raine, 1997; Zhan-Waxler et al., 1995). Thus, it may be posited that such ANS 
anomalies underlie antisocial pattems in youth and adult males. This condition is expressed as 
a lack of empathy and concern toward others. The findings revealed that lower heart rate and 
lower SCRs were linked with externalizing behaviors, co-occurring with lower empathetic and
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prosocial behaviors. Furthermore, the most anomalous SCRs have been found in children with 
CD-ADHD comorbidity.
Skin conductance responses are a very sensitive index of the orienting response to 
stimuli (Scarpa & Raine, 1997). This indicates an allocation of attentional resources to the 
processing of stimuli. As previously noted, the orienting network functions to motorize special 
neuronal operations that are required to bring attention to the relevant visual location (selective 
visual search) and bind signals into object perception (Jackson et al., 1994: Posner & 
DiGirolamo, 1998; Swanson et al., 1998). The brain regions purported to be involved are the 
posterior parietal lobe and thalamus. The orienting network acts together with other aspects of 
the attentional system to increase relevant signal detection, resulting in the content o f one’s 
awareness. As previously noted, such a system has been implicated as important for the 
accurate perception of FEE.
It is reasonable to expect that inherited temperamental differences due to various brain 
structures and circuits will affect a child’s reactivity to situations. Children who embark on the 
conduct problem pathway in their early years, and present as persistent antisocial and violent 
individuals, may have inherited a brain physiology that raises the threshold of consciously 
experienced anticipatory anxiety, fear and guilt about what violates community standards 
(Kagan, 1997). It is thought that most children and adults experience these feelings at an 
intensity that moderates their behavior as a result of adequately functioning somatovisceral 
reality checks. However, conduct disordered children possess less brain sensitivity or 
responsiveness from the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal surfaces. As a result, they are 
less inhibited than the majority with regard to significant misbehavior. As discussed, FEE 
perception likely leads to retrieval of relevant information, i.e., body states, fi:om the diverse 
neural system that serves emotion. Past body states have been identified as an important
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information component that relies on associated ANS and somatovisceral activity information, 
among other factors (Adolphs et al., 1996). Relative inability to access this information or other 
reality based information would likely diminish or impair accurate FEE perception.
Central Nervous Svstem Anomalies
Although the literature regarding brain physiology in antisocial children, youth and 
adults lacks definitive findings, there are a few broad implications. For example, abnormal 
functioning of the right hemisphere has been implicated in delinquent and criminal conduct 
(Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994). The proposed connection is in the bias of negative emotionality, 
which is more relatively associated with the functioning of the right hemisphere. Furthermore, 
the right hemisphere is associated in the processing of non-verbal stimuli. Negative 
emotionality is characteristic of individuals who tend to be less dependent on language to guide 
their behavior.
The frontal lobes have also been implicated in conduct problems. Adolescents 
diagnosed with CD manifest impairments that are characteristic of dysfunction found in adults 
with frontal lobe damage, such as failure to use feedback to correct responses (Lueger & Gill, 
1990), problems in attention and concentration (Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994), and diminished 
selective attention. That is, they respond to irrelevant stimuli in the same manner as relevant 
stimuli (Pincus, 1999). Furthermore, it is suggested that such problems would likely diminish 
the accurate perception of FEE.
Detecting Facial Expressions of Emotion
The limited focus of the literature on FEE recognition and conduct disordered children, 
excluding incarcerated youth, has found that children with CD have an impaired ability to 
accurately recognize FEE in general, regardless of CD severity (Greer, 1997). Furthermore, 
children who demonstrate these behavioral problems early also demonstrate significant
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impairment compared to children who develop CD later. Although masked by more apparent 
behavior problems, the perception process is definitely abnormal in those with CD (Meloy & 
Gacono, 1998). It is expected that this abnormality is also experienced by incarcerated youth.
Purpose of Study and Hypotheses 
Given that incarcerated youth appear to represent a very troubled population that 
demonstrates significant behavioral, social, cognitive and emotional deficits and sequelae, it 
would not be surprising to discover some level of impaired ability to accurately perceive FEE. 
As noted, many common problems appear to have, in part, definite neuropsychological 
foundations that are linked conceptually with the neuropsychology of emotion and potentially 
extend to the perception of facial expressions of emotion. The construct of alexithymia was 
included in the study due to its association with FEE perception in the literature (Parker et al., 
1993; Prkachin & Prkachin, 2001, March) and its purported neuropsychology.
Given the significant pressure on community and government resources to develop 
meaningful interventions and corrective strategies for behaviorally challenged youth, it would 
be useful to determine if social difficulties experienced by this population are related, in part, to 
a deficit in perceiving socially important information, especially under demanding temporal 
circumstances. The study explored this question in two phases. The first phase investigated 
whether there was a difference among incarcerated youth in their adequacy of accurately 
perceiving socially relevant information conveyed by the face, specifically facial expressions of 
emotion, under time constraints. It was hypothesized that youth with high alexithymia would 
perform less accurately at detecting facial expressions o f emotion than non-alexithymic youth, 
under time constraints.
The second phase investigated whether there was a difference between incarcerated 
youth and non-incarcerated youth in their ability to accurately perceive socially relevant
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information, specifically facial expressions of emotion, under time constraints. Two hypotheses 
were explored. The first hypothesis was that incarcerated youth would perform less accurately 
at perceiving facial expressions of emotion, under time demands, as compared to non­
incarcerated youth. The second hypothesis was that incarcerated youth are more significantly 
affected by alexithymia, contributing to a diminished ability to accurately perceive facial 
expressions of emotion, as compared to non-incarcerated youth.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Methods
Phase 1 : Incarcerated Sample
Participants
Thirty-four participants, ranging in age from 15 to 18 years, were recruited from youth 
confined to a Canadian youth custody centre. The sample consisted of 23 males (M_ age = 
16.56) and 11 females (M age = 16.36) with an overall mean age of 16.5. Typically, the youth 
were incarcerated for criminal behaviour that included a variety of summary to indictable 
(including capital) offences. Participation in the study was solely on a voluntary basis, with 
youth indicating their interest by printing their name on a sign-up poster. The poster introduced 
the study as one concerned with facial expressions of emotion and suggested that participants 
may find such a study interesting. As no incentive was offered for participating in the study it 
was assumed that youth who volunteered did so for personal interest. All spoke English as their 
primary language. Although not a factor in this study, those of Aboriginal descent typically 
account for between 35% to 55% of the centre’s population, with the remaining population 
typically made up of Caucasians.
Measures
All of the incarcerated participants completed two self-report measures: the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, see Appendix A) and the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20, Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994, see Appendix B). The 
TAS-20 questionnaire was used to determine if the hypothesized inadequacy to detect FEE was 
associated with the proposed neuropsychology of alexithymia. As such, alexithymia would 
seem to be one reasonable construct to question in this study. The PANAS questionnaire was 
used to assess the potential presence of positive or negative affectivity that could confound the
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results of the study. The TAS-20 self-report measure involves rating 20 items on a 5-point 
Likert scale for a maximum score of 100. The 20 items are divided into three sub-scales or 
factors: 1) difficulty identifying feelings; 2) difficulty describing feelings; and 3) externally 
oriented thinking. Although alexithymia is a dimensional construct, cutoff scores have been 
established on the TAS-20 to enable the division of the subject sample into 3 alexithymia (TAS) 
groups: high alexithymie (>61), intermediate (52-60), and nonalexithymic (< 51) (Lane et al., 
1996).
The TAS-20 has demonstrated internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and good 
test-retest reliability (.77) in both clinical and non-clinical populations and reported high 
convergent and concurrent validity and moderate discriminate scale validity (Bagby et al.,
1994).
The PANAS self-report measure uses a 5 point Likert scale to identity participants who 
may be high or low in negative affectivity (NA) and positive affectivity (PA). It is comprised of 
two 10 item mood scales, one for NA and one for PA, that are useful for identifying possible 
anxiety, depression, and general psychological distress (Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS 
scales provide reliable, precise and largely independent measures of positive and negative affect 
regardless of the subject population or the time frame and response format used. Positive affect 
reflects the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active, and alert, with high PA scores 
characterizing high energy, full concentration, and pleasurable engagement and low PA scores 
characterizing sadness and lethargy. Negative affect reflects subjective distress and unpleasant 
engagement that subsumes a variety of aversive moods like anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear 
and nervousness, with low NA scores characterizing a state of cahnness and serenity. These 
scales may also indicate individual differences concerning positive and negative emotional 
reactivity. The unique circumstances o f youth custody made it advisable to assess potential
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situational effects that could impact the participant’s ability to detect FEE. This measure has 
been reported to have good internal consistency, high test-retest reliability, and good convergent 
and discriminant validity (Watson et al., 1988). However, there is no information relative to its 
age group or cross-cultural validity.
Materials
A videotape of 90 stimulus faces composed from Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) Pictures 
of Facial Affect of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust and surprise were used in this study. 
The face stimuli (images) were arranged on videotape with video editing equipment (Fast FM 
Studio). Each image was captured as a digital graphic image and presented as a single fhune for 
about the duration of an eye blink (33 ms.) with a 2 second interstimulus interval filled by a 
black screen. The video was presented on the 32 cm X 42 cm screen of a video monitor. The 
stimulus faces were 23 cm X 18 cm on the monitor screen (in the range of actual head size).
The video tape consisted of six sets of 90 FEE images (i.e., trials), one set of images for each 
target FEE under study (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust and surprise). Of the 90 FEE 
images in each set, 15 were the predetermined target FEE, with one target FEE for each set.
The 90 images, or trials, were presented in random order in each FEE set. The 15 images of the 
target FEE (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust and surprise) were presented in random 
order across the 90 trials, with the restriction that the same facial expression could not be 
repeated in succession.
For each of the six target FEE sets in the video tape, a sample display of each target 
stimulus (e.g., happy face) was presented first for five seconds, followed by a neutral image (a 
statue o f a cat) indicating to the participant that their 90 trial detection procedure was about to 
begin. A voice stated the trial image number (sequentially numbered fix)m 1 to 90) immediately 
prior to each stimulus presentation.
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There were four differently ordered versions of the video tape set presentations, videos 
numbered one to four. Each had happiness as the first target FEE set and surprise as the last, as 
these emotions are most consistently correctly detected by participants. The remaining four 
target FEE sets (i.e., fear, sad, anger and disgust) were presented in a different order between 
the happiness and surprise target FEE set presentations. The purpose of this arrangement was to 
minimize order effects.
Design and Procedure
This study utilized a mixed design and took approximately 60 minutes for each 
participant to complete. The between-subject design involved half of the participants 
completing the TAS-20 and half the PANAS questionnaire prior to viewing the video series 
followed by completion of the remaining questionnaire after the viewing. Participants were 
randomly allocated to complete either the before or after questionnaire. The within-subject 
design involved a comparison of the participants’ ability to detect the various facial expressions. 
Participants went through the entire study procedure separately and sequentially to minimize the 
potential for interpersonal problem behaviors that are common in custodial institutional 
settings. The time of the youths’ participation in the study varied according to the operational 
requirements o f the institution—late morning to mid-aftemoon; however, the location within 
the institution was the same for each participant. The sample data were collected over a five 
month period from late 1999 to early 2000.
All components of the process occurred in the same room and in one sitting, one 
participant at a time. Firstly, each participant was required to read along with the tester and sign 
a consent form (see Appendix C). This was followed by their completion o f the randomly 
assigned questionnaire. Next, each participant was seated in fix)nt of the video monitor and the 
procedure for the remainder of the process was explained.
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Each participant viewed only one of the four versions of the video tape, starting with 
tape one for the first participant, followed by each subsequent participant viewing the next 
successive video in sequence, always in order fi-om one to four.
This study used the ‘yes only’ form of the detection test (i.e., versus yes-no) in which the 
participant’s task was to decide whether the target FEE was present. Prior to each participant 
viewing a video, instructions were read aloud indicating that they were to identify a target FEE 
(i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, or surprise) in each numbered face on the video 
and respond with ‘yes’ if they detected the emotion or silence if they did not. Furthermore, it 
was explained that for each target FEE set a sample display would appear for 5 seconds, 
followed by an image of a cat statue indicating that the detection procedure was about to begin. 
The experimenter stood to the side and slightly behind the subject’s chair for the purpose of 
manually recording their responses. Participants then viewed a video tape with the content as 
described in the materials section. Upon completion, subjects completed the remaining 
questionnaire.
Debriefing
Youth Custody Centre participants were accompanied individually to the specified 
testing room by a youth custody supervisor. Most appeared cautious when entering the room 
and avoided eye contact initially. The experimenter was able to quickly establish rapport with 
all but one of the participants.
The testing process, consent procedure and steps taken to maintain the anonymity of 
participants were explained to each subject. It was also noted that if  they felt uncomfortable at 
any time they could stop the process and return to their unit. The participant with whom the 
experimenter was unable to establish rapport completed one questionnaire and proceeded 
through approximately half of the videotape before advising that he was leaving. One other
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participant ended the session early because he was in pain due to a recent injury incurred while 
playing a sport in the gymnasium. The balance of the participants engaged willingly in the 
study-albeit some more enthusiastically than others.
All of the participants left the testing room immediately upon completion of the final 
questionnaire and only one asked questions about the potential outcome of the study.
Phase 2: Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Sample
Participants
Phase two of this study compared data between the incarcerated sample (fi’om phase 1) 
and a community sample, herein referred to as the non-incarcerated sample. The non- 
incarcerated sample data were thirty-one 17 to 18 year-old volunteers from a group of 
introductory psychology students used in a previous study from the University o f Northern 
British Columbia (Prkachin & Prkachin, 2001, March). The 31 participants consisted of 14 
males (M age = 17.9) and 17 females (M age = 17.9), with an overall mean age of 17.9. As 
referenced, these 31 participants were part of a larger study of 127 participants, ranging in age 
firom 17 to 35 years (M = 22.5), assumed to be a homogenous group.
Measures. Materials. Design and Procedure
The measures, materials, design and procedure used in the Prkachin & Prakchin (2001, 
March) study were the same as outlined in phase one of this present study. The use of the TAS- 
20 questionnaire was alternated to either before or after viewing the video tape; the PANAS 
questionnaire was not used in the Prkachin & Pricachin (2001, March) study. This study used a 
research lab at the University of Northern British Columbia to study their participants, one 
person at a time.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Results
Phase 1 : Analysis for Incarcerated Sample
TAS-20 and PANAS Descriptive Statistics
The total score on the TAS-20 and its three subscales were determined. The TAS-20 
scores were converted to categories of low (total scores less than 52), intermediate (scores from 
52 to 60) and high alexithymia (scores greater than 60) based on the criteria provided by Lane et 
al. (1996). There were 28.1 % incarcerated participants who scored above 60 on the TAS-20, 
21.9% who had scores from 52 to 60, and 50% who had scored below 52. Descriptive statistics 
for the TAS groups are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithvmia Groups for 
Incarcerated Youth
TAS Group M SD n Min Max
High 67.22 4.97 9 61 76
Intermediate 55.71 3.73 7 52 60
Non 45.75 4.60 16 35 51
Note: High alexithymia were scores > 61, intermediate from 52 to 
60, and low <51. Non refers to non-alexithymic.
The total score on the PANAS and its two component factors for the incarcerated 
sample were determined. The PANAS scores were converted to categories of low and high NA 
( X critical > 23.19) and low and high PA ( x critical < 29.72) (Watson et al, 1988), resulting in 
the division of the participants into four sub-groups according to their combined PANAS
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scores. Group one had low NA and high PA comprising 40.6 % of the sample, group two had 
high NA and high PA comprising 28.1 % of the sample, group three had low NA and low PA 
comprising 18.8 % of the sample, and group four had both high NA and low PA comprising 
12.5 % of the sample. It was anticipated that the group having the combination of critical 
means for NA (high) and PA (low), in this case group four, would possibly indicate the greatest 
effect on the participants’ sensitivity toward the perception of FEE in the subsequent analysis. 
The descriptive statistics for PANAS groups is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics for PANAS Groups for Incarcerated Youth
Negative Affectivity Positive Affectivity
Group n M SD M SD
One 13 16.54 3.62 35.85 4.10
Two 9 30.00 4.66 35.00 3.04
Three 6 18.83 3.31 26.83 2.40
Four 4 32.00 7.62 25.75 3.95
Note: NA critical mean > 23.19, PA critical mean < 29.72.
Detection Index f A’) Analvsis
An alpha level o f .05 was used for all statistical tests. Perception o f the FEE data was 
assessed by a signal detection procedure, the A1 (A-prime) index, a nonparametric model to 
determine a good estimate o f forced-choice stimulus detection performance as recommended by 
Snodgrass & Corwin (1988). The calculation of their performance was determined first by the
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frequency of hits and false alarms. A hit (H) was defined by the subject saying the correct 
response ‘yes’ to the trial target FEE (e.g., saying yes to fear) in a set o f 90 trials when it was 
actually presented; a false alarm (FA) was defined by the participant saying the incorrect 
response ‘yes’ when the non-target FEE was presented (e.g., saying ‘yes’ when happiness, 
sadness, surprise, disgust, or anger were presented rather than the target fear). The frequency of 
hits and false alarms were subsequently converted into probabilities (PH & PEA) which were 
used to calculate measures of the participants’ ability to detect the target FEE, A1 = (0.5 + 
((PH-PFA) * (1 + PH - PFA)) / ((4* PH) * (1 - PFA)). ^  is an estimate of the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic curve defined by a single pair of hit and false alarm 
probabilities. On the occasions that false alarms were greater than hits the formula A1 = 0.5 - 
((FA-H)(1+FA-H)) / 4FA(1-H)) was used (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). This procedure was 
performed for each of the six target emotions, comprising six sets of 90 FEE trial presentations. 
For the main study test, the A1 results for each participant were then entered into a repeated 
measures analysis o f variance (ANOVA). The sensitivity to the six expressions of emotion was 
the repeated measure. The PANAS groups and the TAS-20 subgroups were the between- 
subject factors.
Initial examination of the data revealed that two of the cases had one or more A’ 
standardized scores in excess of 3.29, indicating potential outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Consequently, prior to entering the incarcerated sample into further analyses, these two cases 
were removed from the data and omitted from the study, reducing the incarcerated sample size 
from 34 to 32.
Prior to the main analysis, several preliminary analyses were performed. Because the 
selection of age could not be controlled, significant unequal age representation resulted. The 
incarcerated sample consisted o f 15 to 18 year-olds, with five 15 year-olds, three 16 year-olds,
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fourteen 17 year-olds, and six 18 year-olds. In contrast, the comparison sample ages ranged 
from 17 to 18 years, with three 17 year-olds and twenty-eight 18 year-olds. As the anticipated 
result would likely be confounding effects, thereby distracting from the main interest o f the 
study, age was added as a covariate in certain analyses and ignored in others as was appropriate 
based on the following tests. First, the results of a two-tailed Pearson correlation analysis 
confirmed that age was not significantly related (p > .05) to any of the emotion A1 scores, 
indicating that age was not correlated with detection performance. Second, the results of a 
three-way univariate ANOVA testing age (dependent variable) and the order of questionnaire, 
order of tape and gender (independent variables) revealed that age was not significantly 
different between these factors. Also, research has demonstrated (Masters & Carlson, 1988) 
that at about age 10 children are as accurate at detecting basic FEE as adults. Consequently, 
age was excluded from further analysis.
Another preliminary test was conducted to analyze whether gender, order of 
questionnaire and order of tape had any effect on FEE detection A1 results. It has been 
identified in the literature (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998) that subtle differences exist in how males 
and females respond to a number of discrete emotions and that females seem to have the 
advantage in decoding emotional information. Consequently, gender was included in the 
subsequent preliminary analysis. The form of the test was a 2 (gender) x 2 (questionnaire order) 
X 4 (tape order) x 6 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA, with emotion as the repeated 
measure. There were no between-subject main effects for gender, questionnaire order or tape 
order; furthermore, there were no statistically significant interactions between these variables. 
However, there was a within-subject main effect of emotion, F (3.27,5) = 21.43, p = .000, r\~ = 
.56, but no significant within-subject interactions for these variables. The lack o f effect by 
questionnaire order, tape order and gender on emotion detection performance has been
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confirmed elsewhere (Prkachin & Prkachin, 2001, March). Other research (Holder & 
Kirkpatrick, 1991; Parker et al., 1993) also confirms that gender has not been a significant 
factor in FEE detection tests. Consequently, to simplify matters, these factors were not included 
in the subsequent analysis.
The final preliminary analysis was a two-way univariate ANOVA that tested age 
(dependant variable), PANAS groups and TAS groups (independent variables). There were no 
main effects nor did these variables significantly interact. This indicated that age was not 
significantly different between these variables and as a result was excluded from the subsequent 
analysis.
The ultimate phase 1 analysis was a 4 (PANAS groups) x 3 (TAS groups) x 6 (emotion) 
repeated measures ANOVA, with emotion as the repeated measure. There was no between- 
subject main effect for either the PANAS groups or TAS groups, nor was there significant 
interaction. There was a significant within-subjects main effect for emotion, Greenhouse- 
Geisser F (5,3.10) = 11.01, g = .000, q“ = .34, but no statistically significant within-subject 
interaction between these three variables. Descriptive statistics for PANAS group A1 are shown 
in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for Emotion Detection Sensitivity A’ bv PANAS Group 
for Incarcerated Sample
Group I n = 13 Group 2 n = 9 Group 3 n = 6 Group 4 n = 4
Emotion M SD M SD M SD M SD
Happy .94 .03 .93 .04 .94 .02 .94 .03
Surprise .92 .04 .90 .08 .89 .05 .90 03
Sad .90 .04 .87 .12 .88 .04 .91 .04
Disgust .86 .08 .82 .09 .76 .17 .92 .02
Anger .80 .11 .80 .09 .76 .16 .86 .03
Fear .74 .05 .69 .09 .66 .07 .71 .07
Note: Group I = low NA and high PA, Group 2 = high NA and high FA, Group 3 = low 
NA and low PA, and Group 4 = high NA and low PA.
Descriptive statistics for TAS group A’ performance are shown in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4
for Incarcerated Samole
Group I n = 9 Group 2 n = 12 Group 3 n = 10
Emotion M SD M SD M SD
Happy .94 .02 .93 .03 .94 .03
Surprise .91 .03 .89 .06 .90 .06
Sad .89 .11 .89 .03 .89 .06
Disgust .84 .11 .80 .11 .86 .12
Anger .82 .08 .79 .08 .79 .14
Fear .70 .11 .72 .04 .71 .06
Note: Group 1 refers to high alexithymia with scores >61, Group 2 refers 
to intermediate alexithymia having scores from 52 to 60, and Group 3 
refers to non-alexithymia having scores <51.
To investigate the within-subjects main effect of emotion, a series o f paired t-tests were 
conducted (see Table 3.5 in Appendix D). The results showed that the incarcerated sample 
detected happiness better than any other FEE; surprise was second, and was detected better than 
anger, disgust, and fear; sadness was third, and was detected better than anger, fear, and disgust 
but not significantly different from surprise; disgust was fourth, and was detected better than 
fear but not significantly different fix>m anger; anger was fifth, and was detected better than fear 
but not significantly different from disgust; fear was last, detected more poorly than any other
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but not significantly difTerent fi’om surprise; disgust was fourth, and was detected better than 
fear but not significantly different fi’om anger; anger was fifth, and was detected better than fear 
but not significantly different fi’om disgust; fear was last, detected more poorly than any other 
FEE. In short, detection accuracy fi’om best to poorest was happiness, surprise (marginally 
better than sadness), disgust (marginally better than anger), with fear last.
Phase 2: Analvsis for Between Samples 
TAS-20 Descriptive Statistics
The subsequent analyses compared FEE detection between the incarcerated and the non- 
incarcerated sample. The total score on the TAS-20 and its three sub-groups were determined 
for the non-incarcerated sample, and are presented along with the incarcerated sample in Table 
3.6 below. In the non-incarcerated sample, 29% scored above 60,38.7% had scores from 52 to 
60, and 32.3% scored below 52.
Table 3.6
Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithvmia Groups bv Sample
Incarcerated Non-incarcerated
TAS Group M SD n Min Max M SD n Min Max
High 67.22 4.97 9 61 76 66.44 5.90 9 61 79
Intermediate 55.71 3.73 7 52 60 55.25 2.41 12 52 59
Non 45.75 4.60 16 35 51 43.20 6.36 10 32 49
Note: High alexithymia were scores >61, intermediate scores firom 52 to 60, and non- 
alexithymia <51.
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Detection Index (A l Analvsis
The signal detection process described in phase 1 was also used in phase 2 for the 
preliminary and the main analysis. Because the selection of age could not be controlled, 
unequal and dissimilar age representation resulted between the samples. As the anticipated 
result would likely be confounding effects, thereby distracting firom the main interest o f this 
study, age was added as a covariate in certain analyses and ignored in others as was appropriate 
based on the following tests. The first test, a three-way univariate ANOVA, testing age 
(dependant variable), questionnaire order, tape order and gender (independent variables) found 
no main effects or significant interactions for these factors. This indicated that age was not 
significantly different between these factors. However, a two-tailed Pearson correlation 
analysis revealed that age was positively and significantly related to the ability to detect 
happiness (r = .49, g = .000) and with surprise (r = .41, g = .001). This indicates that the higher 
the age the better the detection performance of happiness and surprise among the 63 
participants.
Preliminary tests were conducted to analyze the effects of questionnaire order, tape order 
and gender on the detection of emotion fi-om the data of all 63 subjects. The first preliminary 
test involved happiness and surprise covaried with age as these emotions were significantly 
correlated with age. The form of the test was a 2 (questionnaire order) x 4 (tape order) x 2 
(gender) x 2 (emotion) repeated measures ANCOVA, with emotion as the repeated measure. 
The regression for age was significant, F (1,46) = 15.37, p = .000, u ' = .25. The adjusted age 
mean was 17.2. After adjustment by the covariate, the between-subject test showed no main 
effects for or significant interactions between questionnaire order, tape order and gender;
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however, there was a within-subject main effect for emotion, Greenhouse-Geisser F (3.15, 5) = 
95.33, E = .000, = .67, but no significant within-subject interactions.
The next preliminary analysis tested for effects o f questionnaire order, tape order and 
gender on emotion detection for fear, sadness, disgust and anger without age as a covariate, 
because age was not significantly correlated with these emotions. The form of the test was a 2 
(questionnaire order) x 4 (tape order) x 2 (gender) x 4 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA 
with emotion as the repeated measure. There were no between-subject main effects or 
significant interactions between the variables; however, there was a within-subject main effect 
for emotion, Greenhouse-Geisser F (2.34,3) = 57.99, p = .000, r\~ = .55 but no significant 
within-subject interactions. Consequently, to simplify matters, gender, questionnaire order, tape 
order, and gender were omitted fi’om further analysis in this study.
The ultimate phase 2 tests were comprised of one repeated measure ANOVA and one 
repeated measure ANCOVA. Prior to running these tests, a two-way univariate ANOVA was 
conducted with age as the dependant variable and TAS-20 groups and samples as the 
independent variable. The results showed that the only significant relationship between these 
variables was age and sample, F (1,62) = 35.09, g = .000, q" = .38, confirming that age was 
significantly different between the two samples. The subsequent analysis involved happiness 
and fear with age as the covariate, as they were significantly correlated to age. The form of the 
test was a 2 (sample) x 3 (TAS group) x 2 (emotion) repeated measures ANCOVA, with 
emotion as the repeated measure. The regression for age was significant, F (1,56) = 5.63, g = 
.021, q" = .09. The adjusted mean age was 17.2. After adjustment by the covariate, there was 
no between-subject main effect for TAS- 20 groups but there was for sample, F (1,56) = 4.63, g 
= .036, q^ = .08. See Table 3.7 for descriptive statistics for A1 means for TAS-20 groups.
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Table 3.7
Descriptive Statistics for FEE Detection Sensitivity A’ for TAS Group bv Sample
Incarcerated Non-incarcerated
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Emotion M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Happy .94“ .00 .94“ .00 .95“ .00 .97“ .00 .95“ .00 .97“ .00
Surprise .92“ .00 .91“ .00 .91“ .00 .93“ .00 .92* .00 .95“ .00
Sad .89 .11 .89 .03 .89 .06 .92 .03 .90 .05 .92 .01
Disgust .84 .105 .80 .11 .86 .12 .93 .06 .90 .07 .92 .05
Anger .82 .08 .79 .08 .79 .14 .85 .11 .85 .07 .85 .05
Fear .70 .11 .72 .04 .71 .06 .72 .15 .70 .10 .66 .17
Note: Group 1 refers to high alexithymia with scores >61, Group 2 refers to intermediate 
alexithymia with scores from 52 -  60, and Group 3 refers to non-alexithymia with scores 
<51. Superscript “ refers to statistical mean after the adjustment for age.
As shown in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.1 below, the incarcerated sample performed poorest 
at detecting both happy and surprise.
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Table 3.8
Descriptive Statistics for the Between Sample Effects of Emotion (A’)
Incarcerated Non-incarcerated
Emotion M SD MIN MAX M SD MIN MAX
Happy* .95“ .00 .87 .98 .97“ .00 .92 1.00
Surprise* .91“ .00 .72 .98 .93“ .00 .85 .99
Sad .89 .07 .62 .98 .91 .03 .82 .98
Disgust* .83 .11 .47 .96 .92 .06 .76 1.00
Anger* .80 .11 .47 .83 .85 .08 .62 .95
Fear .71 .07 .48 .84 .69 .14 .24 .91
Note: Means and standard deviation for emotion Asterisks (*) indicate emotions that 
were statistically significantly different. The superscript “ refers to statistical mean after 
adjusting for age.
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Happy Surprise Sad Disgust Anger Fear
Emotion
Figure 3.1. Mean Detection Sensitivity ^  for samples. Incar refers to incarcerated 
sample. Non refers to non-incarcerated sample.
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The second main test involved the four emotions not significantly correlated with age: 
fear, sadness, disgust and anger. The form of the test was a 2 (sample) x 3 (TAS group) x 4 
(emotion) repeated measures ANOVA with emotion as the repeated measure. There was no 
main effect for TAS-20 group; however, there was for sample, F (1, 57) = 4.86, p = .032, =
.08. There was also a within-subject main effect for emotion, Greenhouse-Geisser F (2.64,3) = 
66.38, B = .000, i\~ = .24 and a significant interaction for emotion by sample, Greenhouse- 
Geisser F (2.64,3) = 3.43, g = .023, r|^ = .06 (see Figure 3.2 below). An independent samples 
post hoc test showed that the incarcerated sample performed significantly poorer at detecting 
anger, t (56.03) = -2.03, g = .048 and disgust, t (47.09) = -3.41, g = 001. Descriptive statistics 
for A1 performance are shown in Table 3.8.
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Figure 3.2. Within-subject emotion by sample interaction effect 
for fear, anger, disgust and sad between samples. Incar refers to 
incarcerated sample. Non refers to non-incarcerated sample.
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To compare the linear order of accuracy of detecting FEE, a series of paired t- tests were 
conducted (see Table 3.5 in Appendix D). For the incarcerated sample, their detection accuracy 
from best to poorest was happiness, surprise (marginally better than sadness), disgust 
(marginally better than anger), and fear last. The non-incarcerated sample performed similarly 
except they detected surprise better than sadness, but sadness not significantly different from 
disgust. Thus the resulting detection sensitivity for this sample from best to poorest was from 
happiness, surprise, disgust (marginally better than sadness), anger, and fear last.
The differences o f the TAS-20 factor scores between the samples were analyzed. The 
analysis was a one-way univariate ANOVA, testing sample as the dependent variable and the 
TAS-20 factors as the independent variables. The results showed that the samples did not 
significantly differ between their factors 1,2 or 3 score means. Means are shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9
Descriptive Statistics for TAS-20 Alexithvmia Factors bv Sample
Incarcerated Non-lncarcerated
TAS Factor M SD Min Max M SD Min Max
DIF 17.13 6.48 7 31 16.84 4.69 9 31
DDF 13.91 4.87 6 23 14.94 4.19 8 24
EOT 22.94 4.50 12 31 23.19 5.54 10 32
Note. DIF refers to alexithymia factor 1 or Difficulty Identifying Feelings, DDF refers to 
factor 2 or Difficulty Describing Feelings, and EOT refers to factor 3 or Externally 
Oriented Thinking.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Discussion
The underlying purpose o f this study was to explore whether incarcerated youth 
experience an inadequacy in the processing of emotion stimuli. Also of interest was whether 
the inadequacy could be conceptually related to neuropsychological factors underlying the FEE 
detection process and deficits associated with antisocial behaviour. Given the restrictions of 
accessing medical, mental health, behavioural and education information and history of the 
participants, this study used only external sources of information. The data under study, 
obtained from subjects completing two short mental health questionnaires (TAS-20 and 
PANAS) and viewing videotaped FEE, were used to explore the relationship between the 
proposed neuropsychology underlying FEE detection and the proposed neuropsychology of 
deficits associated with antisocial youth. Exploration of this relationship occurred in two 
phases.
Phase 1
The first phase of this study investigated whether there were alexithymia-associated 
differences among incarcerated youth in their ability to accurately perceive socially relevant 
information conveyed by the face, specifically facial expressions of emotion, under time 
constraints. It was hypothesized that youth with high alexithymia would perform less accurately 
at detecting facial expressions of emotion than non-alexithymic youth, under time constraints.
As the results showed, the incarcerated participants’ TAS-20 sub-groups did not 
significantly differ in their detection performance. Individuals with high alexithymia performed 
marginally poorer at detecting happiness, disgust and fear and those who did not have 
alexithymia did marginally poorer at detecting surprise and anger. The intermediate
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alexithymie group did not perform better or poorer on any of the expressions compared to the 
high and low alexithymie groups.
An essential question was whether environmental stressors, and associated emotional 
problems, related to residence in a custodial setting would have a negative effect on detection 
performance. Another important consideration was pre-existing emotional problems caused by 
disruptive family histories and unstable life-styles common in young offenders. The PANAS 
questionnaire was used to examine this issue. As the results showed, existing mood problems 
did not significantly affect the incarcerated participants’ detection performance.
However, that is not to say that potential mood problems were not evident. In fact, the 
questionnaire revealed that 59 % of the incarcerated sample reported high negative affect, low 
positive affect, or a combination of both. In terms of the questionnaire, those who reported high 
negative affect were likely experiencing a high degree of subjective distress and unpleasurable 
engagement, possibly translated into elevated anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear and 
nervousness. Furthermore, low reports of positive affect could indicate that the participant was 
experiencing sadness and lethargy. Moreover, the combination of these emotional states would 
indicate a potentially noteworthy mood problem. For example, research (Bouhuys et al., 1999; 
Bradley et al., 1997; Hale, 1998; Rubinow & Post, 1992) has demonstrated that depression can 
diminish one’s ability to decode facial expressions accurately, especially sadness and happiness. 
As shown in Table 3.3, group 3 of the incarcerated sample, which self-reported as having low 
positive affect, showed a trend toward lower A1 means for surprise (.89), disgust (.76), anger 
(.76) and fear (.66). However, inasmuch as the PANAS questionnaire reflected the presence of 
affect issues, they did not significantly affect the participants’ detection performance.
The results, then, indicate no significant differences associated with alexithymia, 
negative affectivity or positive affectivity among the incarcerated participants in their ability to
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accurately perceive facial emotion as investigated by the PANAS and TAS-20 questionnaires. 
Consequently, the discussion turns to phase 2 of the study, the comparison between the 
incarcerated and the non-incarcerated samples.
Phase 2
The second phase of the study investigated whether there was a difference between 
incarcerated youth and non-incarcerated youth in their adequacy to accurately perceive facial 
expressions of emotion under time constraints. Two hypotheses were explored: that the ability 
of incarcerated youth to detect facial expressions of emotion under temporal constraints would 
be less than that of non-incarcerated youth; and, that this poorer performance would be 
associated with a greater prevalence o f alexithymia among incarcerated youth than non- 
incarcerated youth.
As the results showed, the incarcerated sample was significantly poorer than the non- 
incarcerated sample at detecting 4 o f the 6 FEE, specifically happiness, surprise, disgust and 
anger. Although detection of sadness was not significantly different between the two samples, 
the incarcerated sample did not perform as well at detecting this facial expression, suggesting a 
possible trend toward poorer detection. The reasonfs) for the difference between the two 
samples raises some interesting questions. As shown in phase 1, if the incarcerated sample 
experienced more mood problems during the study, as measured by the PANAS questionnaire, 
their detection performance was not significantly affected. Therefore, the incarcerated sample’s 
significantly poorer detection of the majority of FEE is likely related to some other factorfs). 
This leads to the discussion of the second hypothesis o f phase 2.
It was anticipated that because alexithymia has been significantly related to poorer 
detection performance, and the incarcerated sample would have a higher prevalence of 
alexithymia, their poorer performance as a group would be due to that higher prevalence.
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However, this result was not realized in the study. That is, the incarcerated youth did poorer at 
detecting FEE regardless of the severity of their alexithymia. This outcome was a surprise for 
two reasons. The first was that the incarcerated youth did not have a higher prevalence of 
alexithymia. In fact, although not significantly different, the non-incarcerated sample had 
somewhat more persons with alexithymia, when intermediate and high scores were combined 
for both samples. The second reason was that although both samples reported a rather large 
representation of high alexithymia (28 % for the incarcerated sample and 29 % for the non- 
incarcerated sample), there was no significant affect o f alexithymia on detection performance 
for either sample. This is interesting in light of other research using a sample of university 
students (Prkachin & Prkachin, 2001; Parker et al., 1993) which demonstrates that alexithymia 
subgroups performed significantly differently on the detection of sadness, anger and fear. This 
raises the question as to why alexithymia was not a significant factor in this present study.
There are five possible explanations for this outcome. It may be that alexithymia does 
not necessarily affect the detection process when the participant is required to acknowledge the 
detection of the target expression by saying ‘yes’ and by remaining silent if the target is not 
detected. Although a temporal constraint was used in this study, there was no language demand 
such as having to say the label of the expression, for example ‘happy.’ Perhaps the effects of 
alexithymia are more often experienced down line in the perception process when one is 
required to discriminate between two presented expressions or when labelling demands are 
imposed. For example, research using the TAS-20 and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- 
Revised found that persons with alexithymia showed deficits on the Digit Symbol subtest 
(Duchesneau, 1996). Unlike having to detect a familiar expression such as a happy face, the 
Digit Symbol presents more perceptual demands by requiring the subject to associate certain 
symbols with certain other symbols, thus demanding more concentration. This test is
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considered to be highly sensitive to brain damage and the most affected by minimal brain 
damage of WAIS-R subscales. The results of this test indicate that persons with alexithymia 
experience increased difficulty with visual recognition, visual associative learning and attention 
to detail. It would be interesting to know if the detection performance scores of these 
individuals in the present study would have been significantly affected if more demands were 
incorporated, such as labeling the target expressions or discriminating between expressions.
It could also be that alexithymia, either as a construct or as measured by the current 
version of the TAS-20, is not valid in measuring FEE detection performance in the particular 
age range tested, which was from IS to 18 years. A recent study with a large sample of normal 
participants found that alexithymia was only related to higher ages (Salimen et al, 1995). If this 
is the case, it would suggest that alexithymia may not be an appropriate construct to use with 
adolescents in a performance test for FEE detection.
It is possible that the incarcerated sample is a very unique grouping of youth, with 
emotional developments not experienced by a more normative population. This could explain 
why the reported presence of alexithymia did not affect their detection performance. There is 
support for this notion in the literature (Kroner & Forth, 1995) in that the TAS-20 may not be 
sufficiently sensitive to measure the nuances of emotional capacities of offenders. If this is the 
case, the TAS-20 may not tap into the critical information required to assess this population 
sample’s FEE detection performance.
There is also some question as to whether the factors that make up the TAS-20 measure 
the same thing in every person. For example, the factor of difficulty describing feelings may 
actually be describing something else, such as a primary measure of shyness, social anxiety or 
shame, or a fear o f disclosing inner feelings (Suslow, 1998). Such things may not necessarily 
impact FEE detection test performance. It is interesting to note that many incarcerated youth do
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not readily share their inner feelings. This may be related to, for example, tragic relationships 
with significant family members, high incidence of abuse, poorly developed social skills, 
underachieving and poor self-esteem (Moffitt, 1997). It is worth considering that the TAS-20 
factor of Difficulty Describing Feelings may not necessarily be testing for emotion word 
poverty but rather a learned cautiousness in exposing one’s inner feelings.
Lastly, the non-significant effect for the TAS-20 scores could be due to the rather small 
sample size of 63 participants used in this study, one half of which were incarcerated youth and 
the other a community comparison. According to Cohen (1992) a two group study would 
require at least 64 participants in each group, double that available for this study, to detect a 
medium effect size. If that were true with this study, the problem may be insufficient power 
through sample size to expose a subtle relationship between alexithymia and detection 
performance.
Although not significantly different, it is interesting to note that the incarcerated sample 
had marginally higher scores in all three TAS-20 subgroups (see Table 3.6), with the greatest 
importance related to the low or non-alexithymic group. The marginally higher scores o f the 
incarcerated sample suggest a possible trend of higher alexithymia within that sub-population, 
possibly accounting for some of the differences in detection performance between the samples. 
Biological Explanations
Inasmuch as neither the PANAS nor the TAS-20 scores were significant determinants in 
accounting for the test results between the samples, the proposed neurology underlying FEE and 
proposed neurology linked to deficits associated with young offenders offer some conceptual 
explanations. Given the complexity o f both areas of study, only more general information will 
be considered in the creation of a conceptual frameworic to examine potential correlates that 
may be construed as rising fix>m structural anomalies or functional deficits.
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The most important interconnection may be the attendonal system. It appears that 
attentional processes play a primary role in detecting emotional stimuli, not only because of 
emotion’s significant import in social communication, but also because adequately functioning 
attention is crucial in situations involving significant time constraints, such as in this study. If 
one is to process information, such as FEE, one would need to attend to a stimulus to a 
sufficient degree to detect it accurately. It is therefore possible that the process of attention 
could be the key factor for the results of this study.
One important factor that has been associated with problematic attention is ADHD. Its 
relevance to this current study is the significant prevalence of ADHD among antisocial youth, 
including incarcerated youth, and the fact that this disorder decreases performance in FEE 
detection tests. Those with ADHD tend to notice fewer targets and make more perceptual 
errors. Interestingly, this disorder has been related to a global hypofrontality with large 
reductions of neural activity in different prefrontal cortical areas, right medial frontal cortex, 
right inferior prefrontal cortex and areas of the basal ganglia (i.e., caudate nucleus and cingulate 
area) and its connections to the orbito-frontal, temporal and thalamic areas (Harris, 1995a; 
Rubia et al., 1999). An attentional system that includes some of the aforementioned structures 
has been proposed in the literature (Jackson et al, 1994; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998; Swanson 
et al., 1998). This attentional system is thought to be made up of two subsystems, the anterior 
attentional system (AAS) and the posterior attentional system (PAS), and have three networks: 
the alerting network (organism readiness) centering on the right frontal lobe and right parietal 
lobe; the orienting network (motorizes attention to relevant visual location and object percept), 
centering on the posterior parietal lobe and thalamus; and, the executive network (e.g., target 
detection: form and category) centering on anterior cingulate, left lateral frontal lobe and basal 
ganglia.
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Research with ADHD patients provides support for its connection to the attentional 
system (Swanson et al., 1998). Studies using event related potentials (ERPs) suggest 
abnormalities in the right frontal region, implicating the alerting network; and the right parietal 
region, implicating the orienting network. Research using imaging technology such as positron 
emission tomography suggests abnormalities in the frontal lobe, implicating both the alerting 
and executive networks. Studies using anatomical magnetic resonance imaging show smaller 
than normal size corpus collosum, basal ganglia, and right frontal lobes, thus implicating all 
three networks (orienting, alerting, and executive networks respectively). The ADHD 
symptomatology of inattention describes poor sustained attention related to an alerting deficit, 
poor selective attention related to an orienting deficit, and poor stimulus detection related to an 
executive function deficit. As can be gathered, accurate perception requires an adequately 
functioning attentional system to gather relevant task information.
Given that attention must be present to detect a stimulus, it would be reasonable to 
expect that the neurology of attention would be connected, whether directly or working in 
parallel through networks, with activity related to the neurology involved in FEE detection. For 
example, a recent study (Streit et al., 1999) using magnetoencephalography revealed a spatial 
neural activity that is crucially involved in the decoding of basic FEE (happiness, sadness, fear, 
surprise, disgust, and anger). This activity was noted in the posterior superior right temporal 
cortex, the inferior occipitotemporal cortex (areas of the early visual processing stream), the 
middle sector of temporal cortex (having numerous anatomical connections to the dorsal and 
ventral visual stream), the right amygdala, right anterior cingulate, left inferior prefrontal cortex, 
and the left inferior frontal structures for all FEE. In short, the process activated the inferior 
frontal cortex, amygdala and different parts of the temporal cortex. As reviewed earlier, 
neuroimaging techniques have indicated medial prefrontal cortex, thalamus and cingulate gyrus
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activity for happiness, sadness and disgust; parts of the basal ganglia active for sadness and 
disgust; amygdala, temporal gyrus and medial frontal cortex active for fear and anger; and, 
temporal lobe damage associated with anger and disgust FEE.
It is interesting to note that most of the structures associated with the functioning of 
ADHD, attention and FEE detection overlap and are connected by various complex neural 
networks and loops, contributing to the function at hand. For example, the basal ganglia are 
indicated in all three areas and are significant in target detection; furthermore, the basal ganglia, 
through their manifold connections to the cortex via the cortico-striate-thalamo-cortico circuit, 
contribute to the circuit’s common information processing and act as a comparator o f spatial 
representations. The temporal lobe is also involved; for example, through its many parts that 
relate to sensory integration, feature selection, object recognition, and perception of eye and 
mouth movement (primary in emotion identification). Furthermore, the temporal lobe is active 
in the flow of information within the visual stream with its interconnections to the frontal, 
occipital and parietal lobes. Parts of the cingulate are also implicated as contributing toward 
target detection by boosting activation and reactivation of extrastriate regions of selection 
expectations in feature detection. The prefrontal cortex is also implicated and is considered as 
the end point of sensory integration for the dorsal and ventral visual streams through its many 
interconnections to, for example, visual regions of the temporal lobe, superior temporal sulcus 
and amygdala, posterior parietal areas, the cingulate and the basal ganglia. With such complex 
neuronal interconnections, the prefrontal cortex is a significant contributor in the processing of 
social and contextual infonnation and behavior responses. Furthermore, the prefrontal areas 
influence the autonomic system which are implicated as important factors in emotional 
responses. Taken together, such neural and anatomical connections and activity could be a 
significant factor in the incarcerated sample’s poor performance in FEE detection, and may also
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have implications beyond the immediate situation to the larger behaviour issues associated with 
this subpopulation.
The hypoactivity of the reticular activating system (RAS) has also been implicated as 
contributing to some aspects of ADHD. As indicated in the literature review, ADHD is 
frequently associated with antisocial youth. The RAS is best understood for its arousal or 
modification of brain fimctioning, having a diffuse neural system that extends to the thalamus 
and hypothalamus and likely into parts of the cerebral cortex, giving rise to ascending and 
descending systems (Kalat, 1988; Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). Normally, the RAS is not 
completely connected to the limbic system until adolescence, and even later for persons with 
ADHD. This hypofimctioning of the RAS may contribute to a more global hypofunctioning 
associated with ADHD, especially related to the attentional system and poorer perception of 
FEE.
Other deficits associated with antisocial youth include learning problems and emotional 
dysregulation or difficult temperament. Difficult temperament may contribute to reduced 
detection performance inasmuch as autonomic anomalies are thought to be associated with 
problems in the attention orienting processes. With diminished orienting, the binding of 
stimulus signals in object perception, critical in the performance of FEE detection, will likely be 
hampered. This deficit has been associated with the attentional system and linked to the 
posterior parietal lobe and thalamus.
Children with learning challenges evidence less accuracy in identifying and decoding 
non-verbal cues such as social-emotive signals or expressed emotions. Recent research has 
shown that children with learning disabilities are less proficient at interpreting emotions from 
facial expressions (Holder & Kirkpatrick, 1991). This reduced accuracy in decoding social- 
emotive signals is thought to be more o f a right hemisphere pathology. This is interesting in
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light of arguments in the literature that the right hemisphere plays a major role in emotion and 
FEE detection and is thought to be associated with delinquent and criminal behaviour. A 
mutual problem that might overlap between these areas could be a failure of the frontal lobe to 
successfully integrate sensory information important for attentional processes and behaviour 
correction
Taken together, the interrelated neurology and brain anatomy linked with deficits 
associated with antisocial youth and underlying FEE processes provide a conceptual framework 
that suggests the incarcerated sample’s poorer performance in the detection test may have been 
due to a less adequate attentional system, either directly or from interconnections. However, 
more research needs to synthesize the literature in both areas to verify this hypothesis. 
Theoretical Implications of a Deficit in Detection Performance
The results of this study indicate that incarcerated youth performed significantly less 
accurately at detecting facial expressions of emotion when given a very limited period of time 
(the speed of an eye blink) to make the observation. How might this reduced adequacy impact 
their behavior? As social creatures, humans rapidly observe numerous facial expressions with 
little conscious thought or recollection. These quick observations may give rise to first 
impressions that are difficult to dispel. Perhaps these glimpses provide us with information that 
serves to weigh or bias our decision to engage in social interaction, and how we will engage. It 
could be that the degree of accuracy in detecting facial expressions contributes to and reinforce 
one’s style of social engagement and adaptiveness.
The notion of an emotional fast-track system related to quick detection and reaction to a 
threatening stimulus has been proposed in the literature (LeDoux, 1994). The idea stems from 
research on fear. From an evolutionary standpoint, such a system would be advantageous or 
even essential to avoid situations that present potential threats to safety, well-being and, more
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importantly, to survival. If such a reaction system exists for fear, other basic emotions may 
have their own version of a fast-track type system for different reasons and purposes. For 
example, detecting a happy expression may trigger a body state, an internal reaction, which 
relays the sense that the immediate experience is potentially good. In this case, rather than 
avoiding a potential threat, the person relaxes, ‘feels good’ about the stimulus and is available 
to engage positively. At the moment when the happy expression was detected, the attentional 
system became conservative by orienting its energy and processes to that stimulus. What 
happens, then, if the detection accuracy is poor?
The impact of a poor detection system likely depends on whether it resulted from a 
simple failure to detect (i.e., neglect), was caused by a perceptual bias in what was thought to be 
the expressed stimulus, or was the outcome of frequent random error. If detection accuracy has 
any weighting on behavior, one could speculate that merely neglecting to detect an expression 
would be less serious than erroneously indicating a certain expression’s presence, indicating 
low discrimination, or poor accuracy due to frequent random error. In neglecting to detect, one 
might be characterized as slow in recognizing cues and engaging in social interaction. In the 
case o f a biased response pattern, one might be characterized as being more prone to a certain 
style of interacting, be it positive or negative. Finally, a person demonstrating frequent random 
error might be characterized as disorganized, frustrated and less predictable.
Young offenders’ interactions within the confines of a custody facility are fraught with 
frequent outbursts of aggression that at times appear to be without cause. The preceding 
discussion and the results of this study suggest that the problem, in part, maybe associated with 
a deficit in accurately recognizing facial expressions, which may subtly impact further decoding 
and subsequent behavior. Although this study did not explore the differences between the 
samples related to bias and error analysis, it may be speculated that incarcerated youth are
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frequently victims of aggression in part because they fail to accurately detect important facial 
cues. For example, detecting angry expressions too late may interfere with anticipating a 
problem in time to divert the situation. Or, a youth with a particular detection bias, say thinking 
a disgust expression is directed towards him when in fact the expression was sadness, might 
trigger an erroneous somatovisceral state that directs him towards an altercation. Furthermore, 
a person who makes frequent errors in detecting facial cues may be more unpredictable and 
volatile (i.e., heightened somatovisceral state), their frustration resulting from being 
perceptually disorganized leading to aggression with minimal provocation. Although 
interesting for discussion, such speculation has not been addressed in the literature, to the 
author’s knowledge, and requires further study to establish whether data can support such 
hypotheses.
One of the expressions detected less accurately by the incarcerated sample was disgust. 
This may have some important implications about the ability of young offenders to self-correct 
socially aberrant behaviour. An important function of disgust expressions is to convey 
disapproval of what is occurring or has transpired and to indicate that it is not socially 
acceptable. A normal reaction to being the object of an expression of disgust would be a feeling 
of anxiety that should ultimately result in some effort to make the appropriate behavioural 
changes. Many people are discouraged from engaging in criminal activities by intense feelings 
of shame, guilt and anxiety that appear to be effective restraints. It has been suggested (Kagan, 
1997) that some offenders continue to engage in criminal behaviour because they lack intense 
anticipatory anxiety or guilt related to the consequence o f conunitting crime. A deficit in these 
crucial feelings is thought to be linked to reduced responsiveness in the orbitofrontal cortex or 
amygdala to sensory information from areas like the stomach, heart, and muscles that 
accompany anxiety and guilt. It is interesting to note that these anatomical areas are also
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associated with the emotion of disgust. Consequently, the offender may not attend adequately 
to disgust expressions and/or to the weakened signals of anxiety, and thus fail to censor their 
behaviour.
One of the main concerns related to incarcerated youth is an apparent lack of empathy 
and remorse sufficient to effect change in their behavior. If poor detection o f emotional 
expressions is associated with the capacity for empathy, given that to be empathetic one needs 
to accurately detect another’s emotional state, the results of this study may provide crucial 
information for intervention strategies. For example, in addition to the cognitive skills model of 
therapy offered in custody centres, it would be important to incorporate ways to assist young 
offenders to become sensitive to facial expressions of emotion, thereby increasing the 
possibility of making the critical connections between behaviour, facial expressions, empathy, 
self-monitoring and self-correction.
Alexithvmia and Young Offenders
Although the TAS-20 scores were not significantly related to the detection performance 
differences between the samples, the topic of alexithymia as it relates to young offenders 
warrants some discussion. To the author’s knowledge, the construct of alexithymia, which may 
offer some insight into behavioural issues, has not been directly applied to the problematic 
behaviour associated with young offenders. It is interesting to note that alexithymia traits have 
been associated with traits of substance abuse and post traumatic stress disorder (Salminen et 
al, 1995). The association between delinquency and substance abuse is well established in the 
literature (Moffitt, 1993a, 1993b), as is its association with post traumatic stress disorder (Eth, 
1990). Therefore, a discussion of alexithymia is warranted regardless of non-significant study 
results.
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The essential factor in alexithymia is a general impairment in the capacity for encoding 
and transforming emotional information; that is to say a deficit in emotional information 
processing. This problem is demonstrated by presenting as emotionally blunt and having 
difficulty in putting emotions into words, indicating a general lack of emotional awareness. In 
this instance, emotional awareness means the capacity to transform implicit knowledge of 
emotion into explicit knowledge through some linguistic system. Part o f the problem may be 
that persons with alexithymia consciously experience the visceral concomitants that comprise 
‘feeling’ an emotion in a disorganized or confused way, or minimally, or not at all. As a result, 
these individuals tend to express themselves through non-verbal behaviour.
Of the 32 young offenders under study, 50 % could be considered to have mild to high 
alexithymia. This is particularly concerning given that many young offenders are generally 
academic underachievers, demonstrate poor language skill development and have learning 
difficulties. Given such concurrent challenges, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
probability of young offenders successfully self-correcting, or being motivated to correct 
aberrant social behaviour, would be low. Furthermore, it is likely that these conditions would 
be highly resistant to intervention. Young offenders who fit this profile would likely 
demonstrate little empathy, take little pleasure in social interaction, and experience a high 
degree of strained interpersonal behaviour, rejection and isolation. These individuals may 
appear to be unconcerned about such dynamics and could be characterized by others as ‘not 
getting it’ or disinterested in what is happening around them.
One study of serious adult offenders (Kroner & Forth, 1995) suggests that the TAS-20 
might be useful in assessing the ability of offenders to identify and communicate emotions. 
Such infonnation may assist in exploring the relationship between emotional arousal and 
physical aggression. Given that social conflicts are inevitable, it would be advantageous to be
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able to monitor one’s level of excitement so as to know when to withdraw in order to prevent 
hostile engagements. However, persons with alexithymia, at least high those with high degrees 
of alexithymia, tend not to monitor internal emotional states and thus ignore feedback from 
emotions in making decisions to avoid or minimize the potential for aggression. In other words, 
without an adequate level of interoceptive awareness, persons with alexithymia will do poorly 
at assessing hostile situations and avoiding aggressive interactions. As such interactions are not 
uncommon in youth custody facilities, it would not be surprising to discover that those with 
alexithymia who participated in this study were also involved in frequent altercations while 
incarcerated. If this were true, information about individuals who potentially have alexithymia 
would have implications for prevention and intervention strategies aimed at reducing such 
behaviour.
If the incarcerated sample studied is at all representative of the percentage of individuals 
with alexithymia present in custody facilitates, it would be important to recognize this special 
subpopulation in the development of effective behavioural management strategies and therapy 
interventions. For example, because they are less aware of emotional feedback, incarcerated 
youth with alexithymia require a behaviour response system that provides immediate cues, such 
as direct informative feedback, about what is transpiring in order to avoid or mitigate hostile 
interactions. The success of such a strategy would require custodial staff to be knowledgeable 
in how to assess and respond to such individuals. By way of therapy, it would be important to 
teach these alexithymie youth emotional awareness and feeling recognition and interpretation 
through frequent debriefing, provide assistance in appraising their social interactions and the 
subsequent ramifications, and assist them to use emotionally descriptive language to raise 
awareness. Although insight-oriented approaches are difficult with persons with alexithymia, 
the therapeutic relationship is critical to gradually preparing these individuals to accept
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interventions (Salminen et al., 1995). However, more research needs to be conducted on 
strategies that work best with those who have alexithymia.
General Theoretical Implications of the Studv
This research is important because it studied young offenders relative to both the 
constructs of alexithymia and the perceptual detection of FEE. This study supports other 
findings that indicate a similar linear order of FEE detection accuracy for basic emotions 
(Prkachin & Prkachin, 2001). The results showed that happy expressions are detected best, 
usually followed by surprise and disgust, with a general trend of sadness and anger, followed by 
fear as the emotion least accurately detected. Although research has yet to clearly establish why 
different emotions are detected better than others, the results of the present study support the 
general notion that each emotional expression is likely to have different qualitative aspects that 
result in different performance demands on the perceptual system.
The results o f this study support not only the linear accuracy of detecting different FEE 
but indicate that incarcerated youth perform with less accuracy than more normative 
adolescents. This could be significant in addressing the remedial needs of young offenders. 
Although this study examined only a small set of emotional expressions, the apparent deficit 
demonstrated by the incarcerated sample may bespeak a potentially more pervasive deficit in 
accurately perceiving other socially important information. It stands to reason that if  perception 
detection accuracy, the essential first step in the more complex stimulus appraisal and response 
system, is poor, behaviour could be affected to some degree. This is a very important 
consideration given that, generally speaking, laws and the threat of sanctions for criminal 
behaviour appear to be relatively ineffective in many cases. The apparent failure to perceive 
consequences that is demonstrated by many young offenders creates frustration within society; 
however, increasing something that is ineffective (longer sentences and harsher conditions)
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does not increase its effectiveness. It is crucial that the developmental issue of possessing a less 
adequate perception system and its implications on behavior be recognized in strategies aimed 
at addressing the offending behaviors of incarcerated youth.
Another general theoretical implication of this study is whether the construct of 
alexithymia (and the TAS-20 subgroups and factors) is useful in researching the ability of 
incarcerated youth to detect emotional expressions in conjunction with extreme time 
constraints. Although alexithymia was indicated through the self-report questionnaire, 
alexithymia did not statistically affect the detection performance in a significant manner. To the 
author’s knowledge, the validity and applicability of the alexithymia construct in a normative 
adolescent population has not been established in the literature. Therefore, an examination of 
the relationship between adolescent development, alexithymia and the TAS-20 measure is 
required.
Limitations of Studv
Caution should be exercised in interpreting and generalizing the results of this study for 
several reasons. Firstly, this study measured perception performance related to a restricted 
number o f stimuli (six emotional expressions) within a specific temporal constraint (33 ms). In 
real life, people deal with enonnous amounts of socially important information within a variety 
of constraints. Therefore, further theoretical development is required to link the importance of 
accurate detection of stimuli within extremely fast time constraints to the importance of such 
functioning in social interactions.
The next limitation is the matter of the comparison sample. The data from this 
particular group came &om first year undergraduate students who may not be representative o f a 
normative sample o f adolescents from the general population. Future studies should include a
81
more general youth population, for example a public high school group, as the comparison 
sample to improve study generalizability.
The samples also had some age-range dissimilarities and fairly inequitable numbers 
within ages. Such disparity made it impossible to include age as a study factor without the 
likelihood of confounding effects. To achieve more generalizable results, subsequent studies on 
this topic should match both the age range and numbers within each age category between the 
samples.
Another, and probably the most important limitation, was the small sample size. 
According to Cohen (1992), the sample size should be large enough to detect small differences 
between two independent samples and not run the risk of mistakenly rejecting the null 
hypothesis. This may have been the case with the expression of sadness and the rejection that 
the reported presence of alexithymia did not significantly affect detection performance. 
According to Cohen, a two group study, such as this, should have 64 participants in each 
sample, half of what was available for analysis in this instance. One way to increase the 
incarcerated sample would be to include youth fiom other provincial custody facilities. 
Furthermore, this strategy would also provide more participants in all of the age categories and 
improve overall representation of youth in custody.
Also, to support the theoretical behaviour implications presented, data need to be 
correlated with current behaviour and mental health records to examine what relationship, if 
any, detection performance has to behaviour performance. Further studies on this topic should 
include sufficient information to determine if  the data support the detection performance- 
behaviour performance hypothesis presented. If this hypothesis is supported by data, research 
can help to develop a more comprehensive theory about the behavioural implications of having 
less adequate perceptual sensitivity in detecting emotional expressions.
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Lastly, the study results are also limited by the use of two self-report questionnaires, the 
PANAS and TAS-20. Because questionnaires are very subjective, there is always the concern 
that respondents have not answered truthfully or have misunderstood what they were being 
asked. Given that incarcerated youth are often academic underachievers, with significant 
deficits in language and learning, the results of the PANAS and TAS-20 may underestimate or 
overestimate some dimensions of alexithymia and therefore be of limited value.
Conclusions
Although not without limitations, this study was important because it included 
adolescent offenders in the research concerning the perceptual performance of detecting facial 
emotion in conjunction with the construct of alexithymia. This study confirmed, as 
hypothesized, that incarcerated youth would perform less accurately than non-incarcerated 
youth in detecting facial expressions of basic emotions. Specifically, the incarcerated sample 
performed significantly more poorly at detecting happiness, surprise, disgust and anger, with a 
trend for sadness. Although neither alexithymia nor a generalized mood disorder provided an 
explanation for the poorer performance by the incarcerated sample, the neurology associated 
with FEE detection and the neurology linked to deficits often associated with antisocial and 
criminal behaviour provided some conceptual explanations as well as a focus on an inadequate 
attention-perception system. Given this result, it would be important to explore if data can 
support the notion that FEE detection performance by incarcerated youth is associated with the 
neuropsychological factors as suggested.
Regardless of the basis for the problem, this study provides valuable information as it 
highlights a potential deficit in the adequacy of incarcerated youth to perceive important social 
information, which may in part be responsible for some of the antisocial behaviour 
demonstrated by this subpopulation.
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Future Research
Because the present study was not able to examine age as a factor, it would be important 
to investigate if the poorer perceptual performance by the incarcerated sample is associated with 
an anomaly in the perception of facial emotion between the ages as compared to a well matched 
community sample. Such a study would help us to understand if incarcerated youth have a 
perceptual problem that is developmentally different between the age groups as compared to 
non-incarcerated youth.
Another interesting study would be to examine if post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
is a significant contributor to poorer detection performance. Many antisocial youth come from 
adverse home conditions and criminogenic environments (Mofütt, 1993a) and have antisocial 
parents, at least one of whom expresses exceptionally violent behaviour (Eme & Kavanaugh, 
1995). In such homes, these children have been targets of harsh and abusive treatment. Some 
of these youngsters were removed from their families by government officials because of 
neglect and abuse. It is reasonable to expect that some young offenders have been traumatized 
in these environments. The literature indicates that traumatized youths may act out with 
problem behaviours such as truancy, substance abuse, delinquency and aggression (Eth, 1990). 
Furthermore, these youths may adopt a rebellious attitude that seems impervious to 
intervention. Given the problem behaviour associated with incarcerated youth, it is likely that 
some are suffering from PTSD. Of the cluster of symptoms associated with PTSD, the 
problems o f irritability and poor concentration could be associated with poorer detection of 
facial emotion.
Although it would be difficult to gain approval for such research, it would be interesting 
to include psychophysiologic infonnation, such as skin conductance and heart rate, collected 
while the youth are viewing presentations of facial emotion. Because autonomic dysregulation
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has been associated with antisocial behaviour, such data could be examined to see if it is 
associated with perceptual differences the present study found between incarcerated and non- 
incarcerated youth. If differences were found, it would provide further support for the 
biological hypothesis that inadequate neurological functioning could contribute to poorer 
perceptual performance, such as the orienting function of the attentional system discussed 
earlier.
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Appendix A
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
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THE PANAS
The following list of words describes different feelings and emotions. Read each item, and then 
mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you 
generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average.
1
very slightly 
or not at all
2
a little
3
moderately
4
quite a bit
5
extremely
interested
distressed
excited
upset
strong
guilty
scared
hostile
enthusiastic
proud
irritable
alert
ashamed
inspired
nervous
determined
attentive
jittery
active
afraid
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Appendix B
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20)
1 0 0
TAS-20
Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by marking the 
appropriate space with a check mark. Give only one answer for each statement.
1
strongly
disagree
2
moderately
disagree
3
neither 
disagree or 
agree
4
moderately
agree
5
strongly
agree
1. I am often confused 
about what emotion I am 
feeling.
2. It is difficult for me to 
find the right words for 
my feelings.
3. I have physical 
sensations that even 
doctors don’t understand.
4. I am able to describe my 
feelings easily.
5. I prefer to analyze 
problems rather than just 
describe them.
6. When I am upset, I don’t 
know iflamsad, 
lightened, or angry.
7. I am often puzzled by 
sensations in my body.
8. I prefer to just let things 
happen rather than to 
understand why they 
turned out that way.
1
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1
strongly
disagree
2
moderately
disagree
3
neither 
disagree or 
agree
4
moderately
agree
5
strongly
agree
9. I have feelings that I 
can’t quite identify.
10. Being in touch with 
emotions is essential.
11. 1 find it hard to describe 
how I feel about people.
12. People tell me to 
describe my feelings 
more.
13. 1 don’t know what’s 
going on inside me.
14. I often don’t know why 1 
am angry.
15. I prefer talking to people 
about their daily 
activities rather than 
their feelings.
16. I prefer to watch “light” 
entertainment shows 
rather than psychological 
dramas.
17. It is difficult for me to 
reveal my iimennost 
feelings, even to close 
friends.
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1
strongly
disagree
2
moderately
disagree
3
neither 
disagree or 
agree
4
moderateiy
agree
5
strongiy
agree
18. I can feel close to 
someone, even in 
moments of silence.
19. I find examination of my 
feelings useful in solving 
personal problems.
20. Looking for hidden 
meanings in movies or 
plays distracts from their 
enjoyment.
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Appendix C
Consent Form
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Informed Consent Form
Note: All research involving human participants at UNBC falls under the authority of the 
Human Research Committee. The University and those conducting this research subscribe to 
the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, confidentiality, 
comfort and safety of all participants.
Present Study: Incarcerated Youth and the Identification of Posed Facial Expressions of 
Emotion.
Researcher’s Personnel: If you have any questions or concerns regarding study procedures and 
questionnaires please feel free to contact Dr. Prkachin at 960-6632 or Ms. Fenner at 565-4153.
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to determine if  there is any relationship between 
incarcerated youth and the ability to identify posed facial expressions of emotion under fast 
conditions.
Task Requirements: All participants will be required to 1) watch videos of various facial 
expressions of emotion, 2) fill out two brief questionnaires, consisting of 20 short questions 
each, one questionnaire before watching the video and one after the video. Both questionnaires 
regard feeling and emotions.
Duration: To complete this study will take participants approximately seventy minutes (forty 
minutes for watching the videos, ten minutes to fill out each of the questionnaires.
Potential Risks: There are no known risks associated with participation in this study.
Anonvmitv/Confldentialitv: The data collected in this study will remain anonymous, and 
individual data will be available only to project staff. No individual data will be released to 
anyone.
Right to Withdraw: If at any time during the experiment you should feel uncomfortable you 
may withdraw without consequence.
Participant Restrictions: Participants must be sentenced. Those who are in remand, facing 
other charges or appealing their sentence cannot participate.
1 have read the above description and I understand the conditions of my participation. My 
signature indicates that I agree to participate in this study.
Signature Date
Witness Date
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Table 3.6 Two-Tailed T-Tests for Paired Emotion Comparisons for Within-Subject
Effects
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Table 3.5
Two-Tailed T-Test for Paired Emotion Comparisons for Within-Subiect Effects
Incarcerated Non-incarcerated
Emotion Pairs t Value D.F. Sig. t Value D.F. Sig.
Happy*-Anger -7.49 31 .000 -8.99 30 .000
Happy*-Disgust -5.18 31 .000 -5.93 30 .000
Happy*-Fear -16.23 31 .000 -11.75 30 .000
Happy*-Sad 3.83 31 .001 9.86 30 .000
Happy*-Surprise 4.00 31 .000 4.83 30 .000
Surprise*-Anger -5.12 31 .000 -7.16 30 .000
Surprise*-Disgust -3.10 31 .004 -3.21 30 .003
Surprise*-Fear -13.56 31 .000 -10.38 30 .000
Surprise-Sad** -1.18 31 .246 -4.67 30 .000
Sad*-Anger -4.48 31 .000 -4.75 30 .000
Sad*-Disgust -2.39 31 .023 .27 30 .789
Sad*-Fear -14.46 31 .000 -9.02 30 .000
Disgust*-Fear 6.22 31 .000 9.05 30 .000
Disgust-Anger** -1.55 31 .132 -4.56 30 .000
Anger*-Fear 4.30 31 .000 5.75 30 .000
Note: Astéries (*) indicates the significantly better mean A1 for paired comparison for both 
samples. Double astéries (**) indicates the significantly better mean A’ for the paired 
comparisons for the comparison sample only. Significance (Sig.) at alpha .05.
107
